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INTRODUCTION
The international regulation of Geographical Indications (GIs) on
products is one of the most contentious issues in the international
negotiations among World Trade Organization (WTO) member states.
The discussion revolves mainly around three issues: (i) the creation of a
multilateral register for wines and spirits, (ii) the extension of the higher
level of protection already existing for wines and spirits to other
products, and (iii) the European Union (EU) initiative to regain the
exclusive use of certain GI names. The United States and the EU are
the two main trading blocks that have set forth the opposing arguments
that define the scope of this active debate. The purpose of this paper is
to provide a thorough analysis of the most significant arguments
presented by WTO delegates and scholars in support of or against the
aforementioned issues. This project also represents an attempt to
propose a policy recommendation for the solution of the conflict. This
recommendation takes into consideration, to the largest extent possible,
the interests of all the parties involved.
The regulation of GIs in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement was the result of a significant
compromise among the WTO member states in which the political and
economic interests of each of the members was taken into account. The
result was a hybrid discipline in which identifiers for similar products
are treated in significantly different ways for no apparent logical reason.
As part of this compromise, the WTO member states agreed in Article
23 of the TRIPs Agreement to negotiate the establishment of a
multilateral system of notification and registration for wines and spirits.
Several proposals have been presented over the years on this subject,
and they can be generalized into two main themes of argument: one
theme proposed by the EU and the other by the United States. The
former proposes the creation of a multilateral register, whereas the
latter supports the establishment of a voluntary database. From reading
the TRIPs Agreement and the available unrestricted documents
prepared during the negotiations, it is clear that the WTO member
states, in entering the agreement, settled on the establishment of some
kind of multilateral register for wines and spirits, and therefore, the EU
proposal on this subject is more in line with the signatories’
expectations. This multilateral register should not be forgone unless a
more efficient system that serves the TRIPs purposes can be identified.
The extension of the level of protection of Article 23 of the TRIPs
Agreement to products other than wines and spirits is a more delicate
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issue. Such an extension could severely affect competition in these new
markets, and thus, could reduce consumer well-being. Therefore, such
an extension should be provided only in the presence of a significant
economic justification, such as the producers’ abilities to meet the
relatively recent consumer demand for varied and high-quality products.
Given this fact, it is possible to conclude that such an extension would
be warranted only when the extra protection under consideration is
related to the production of varied and high-quality products, as in the
case of wines and spirits. In these regards, the concept of terroir
provides significant guidance because it helps to identify those elements
that, because of their strict connection with the territory, are unique and
make the products in consideration unique as well. Indeed, it is this
intrinsic characteristic of the products in consideration that has to be
preserved to meet the consumer demand for variety and quality.
The EU initiative of reclaiming the exclusive use of certain GIs has
no basis other than a retaliatory response for the deadlock of the
negotiations over GIs that preceded the 2003 Cancun meeting. Indeed,
the presence of pre-existing rights to these terms and the fact that many
of these geographic terms are generic in other WTO member states
cannot be overcome by “historical arguments” that define the use of
certain GIs by producers that are not located in the specific
geographical area as a form of usurpation. Therefore, no extension
should be granted for the identifiers included in the EU list because no
legal or economic justification can be identified to support a different
conclusion.
Part I of this paper consists of a brief informational background of
GIs with particular attention given to their historical development and
to the most important international treaties addressing them, such as the
TRIPs Agreement which is at the heart of this controversy. Part II
discusses the creation of a multilateral register for wines and spirits. In
order to facilitate a full understanding of the debate, the existing
proposals are jointly summarized with a thorough analysis of the
relevant portion of the TRIPs Agreement and the preceding
negotiations. This section also presents plausible alternative solutions
for the implementation of the relevant portion of TRIPs. Part III is
dedicated to the analysis of the extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs
Agreement to GIs on products other than wines and spirits. Particular
attention will be provided to the economic rationale for such an
extension and its limits. It also presents a complete overview of the
most important scholarly arguments presented during the negotiations
in support of or against the extension. Finally, the chapter will explore
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why wines and spirits deserve a higher level of protection and will
propose an empirical extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement
only to those products that are similar to the products already included
in the scope of Article 23. In conclusion, Part IV will briefly discuss the
EU initiative to reclaim the exclusive use of certain GIs and will explain
why such an initiative should be rejected.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, DEFINITION, AND INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION
1

GIs “were the earliest types of trademark.” Indeed, GIs have been
part of product identity through history. Even at the very beginning of
wine production in Italy, for example, indications of origin were applied
to containers as a means of classification. Those efforts to protect the
product’s identity shared the same basic motivations of modern day
efforts to provide legal recognition to GIs: economic and consumer
2
protection. In other words, protection of GIs tends to support “the
creation of a distinctive product identifier and the assurance to the
3
consumer of the authenticity of products bearing that identifier.”
A. Historical Background
As international trade started to develop during the eighteenth
century, it became clear that, because of their particular qualities, some
products from a specific region had a much higher success rate on the
4
international market than others coming from a different region. This
trend led merchants to apply marks, which indicated the place of origin
5
of the products, to the products themselves. “These brands were
6
tantamount to a warranty of the quality of these goods,” and local

1. Michael Blakeney, Proposal for the International Regulation of Geographical
Indications, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 629, 629 (2001).
2. Michael Maher, On Vino Veritas? Clarifying the Use of Geographical References on
American Wine Labels, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1881, 1885 (2001).
3. Id.
4. See Blakeney, supra note 1, at 629 (“The superior quality resulted either from
natural geographical advantages, such as climate and geology (e.g. Seville oranges, Kentish
hops, Burgundy wine), recipes and food processing techniques local to a region (e.g. Kyoto
bean cakes, Malmesbury mead, Frankfurter sausages) or indigenous manufacturing skills (e.g.
Toledo steel, Delft ceramic ware, Korean celadon ware).”).
5. Sometimes these brands were also accompanied by depictions of local animals,
landmarks, buildings, heraldic signs or well-known local personalities. Some examples are:
Panda for beer, Mount Fuji for sake, Pisa’s tower for silk, fleur de lys for butter, Napoleon for
brandy, and Mozart for chocolate. Id.
6. Id.
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authorities started to provide protection for the commercial reputation
of these products by passing laws aimed to prevent their adulteration.
Even though a modern system of private trademarks emerged in
Britain as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, its development
7
did not cause, particularly in Europe, the disappearance of GIs. To the
contrary, GIs continued to be associated with those traditional products
for which they were initially created. The continuous success of those
traditional and high-quality products has allowed the survival of GIs
until today. Ultimately, large-scale industrial production developed
much more in the United States than in Europe where well-established
traditional methods of production resisted the aforementioned
8
Industrial Revolution in many areas. As a consequence, a system of
privately owned trademarks that could allow individual producers to be
identified as the exclusive source of their goods came to be of extreme
importance, compared to other identification forms, in what has become
the highly-competitive U.S. market.
Hence, the origin of today’s international conflict regarding the
regulation of GIs can be traced, at least partly, to the different methods
of production, the development of the markets, and the underlying
economic, historical and social background in the “old world” versus the
“new world.”
B. Definition
GIs are generic descriptions that can be used by all the producers in
a particular geographic location for particular goods which are produced
in that region. Most commonly, GIs are place names (in some countries
they are also words associated with that place) or signs that are used on
goods with a specific geographical origin. More specifically:
[T]he term “geographical indication” encompasses both
“indications of source” and “appellations of origin.”
“Indications of source” is commonly understood to mean a word
or other symbol that indicates that a product originates in a
specific geographic region. “Appellation of origin” refers to a
word or symbol that indicates both that the product originates

7. Id. at 630.
8. Several reasons can be identified for such a “resistance” to the Industrial Revolution
in some areas of the old continent. Such reasons range from the particular social and cultural
context in Europe to the development of the local markets. A full analysis of them, although
of extreme importance, goes far beyond the purpose of this paper.
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from a specific geographic region and that it possesses the
9
qualities or characteristics for which the place is known.
GIs are, therefore, used to identify a wide variety of products, such
as Tequila, Scotch, Grappa, Gorgonzola, Parmigiano Reggiano, and
Idaho potatoes and onions, with particular characteristics because they
come from specific places. These products are protected in accordance
with national laws via a wide variety of legal instruments including
specific GI laws, trademark law, consumer protection law, and common
law.
In general terms, the most important characteristic of GIs protected
by a sui generis law as compared to those that are protected by
10
trademark law is the lack of private ownership that makes it possible
for all the producers of a particular region to use and enjoy the right to
11
protect GIs against misappropriation. This element, coupled with the
required essential relationship between the user and the geographic
region, causes GIs to not be freely transferable or licensable to other
producers outside the specific region. Finally, in order to benefit from
this form of identifier, GIs normally require compliance by producers to
12
specific quality standards of production.
9. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WILLIAM O. HENNESSEY & SHIRA PERLMUTTER,
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 315 (2001). It is worth
mentioning that, “[b]ecause of the diverse ways in which the protection of [GIs] has evolved
under national laws, there is no generally accepted terminology,” and that therefore, the
aforementioned expressions (“indication of source,” “appellation of origin,” and the
“geographical indications” itself) represent the most conventional definitions which can be
found in the literature. See Blakeney, supra note 1, at 630. Also, in April 2001, the WTO
Secretariat adopted in this regards the term “indications of geographical origin.” Id. at 631.
10. As mentioned above, GIs pertain to all the products of a particular geographical
location. See supra Part I.B. It is also useful to mention here that in those systems in which
geographic marks are regulated by trademarks instead of a sui generis GIs law, these kinds of
marks receive significant protection from certification marks whose ownership does not vest
in the producers, but in a private third-party. Indeed, the main difference between
certification marks and GIs in this regard is given by the different ownership, which in the
first case vests in a private subject whereas in the second case pertains to all the producers
located in a certain area.
11. However, in general, GIs are monitored and protected by the producer association
of the particular region.
12. The reason for this requirement is related to the goodwill conveyed by the GIs and
its lack of private ownership. Indeed, in order to protect this goodwill, consistency in the
level of quality of the relative products is required, and thus, producers associations normally
create standards of production that must be respected by all the local producers in order to
benefit from the use of the specific GI. See, e.g., the requirements for production of Chianti
Classico DOCG and Olio Extravergine d’Oliva “Riviera Ligure – Riviera dei Fiori “ DOP
(Table 1) infra at p. 56.
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C. The International Regulation of GIs
While a number of attempts to institute the international protection
of GIs have been made, many interested producers and observers are
still awaiting a break-through. The most notable treaties addressing this
13
issue are the Paris Convention of 1883, the Madrid Agreement of
14
15
1891, and the Lisbon Agreement of 1958, as well as a number of
16
The basic concepts developed under these
bilateral agreements.
agreements have been incorporated into the World Trade
Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) of 1994, which became effective on January 1,
17
1995.
More specifically, the Paris Convention was the first multilateral
18
agreement to prohibit the use of false GIs. Subsequently, in response
to a request presented by a number of nations to provide a more
comprehensive regulation, the Madrid agreement expanded the scope
of protection by also including a prohibition against the use of
19
misleading indications. Yet, these provisions failed to gain the support
of important trading nations, such as the United States, Germany and
20
Italy.
The Lisbon Agreement, on the other hand, succeeded in
“establish[ing] an international system of registration and protection of
21
appellations of origin,” but it was only signed by a few nations. The
13. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html [hereinafter Paris Convention].
14. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14,
1891, as revised July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, available at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/
legal_texts/trtdocs_wo015.html [hereinafter Madrid Agreement].
15. Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their
International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, as last revised Jan. 1, 1994, 923 U.N.T.S. 205,
available at http://www.wipo.int/lisbon/en/legal_texts/lisbon_agreement.htm [hereinafter
Lisbon Agreement].
16. See e.g., Council Decision 94/184, EU-Australia Agreement on Trade in Wine, 1994
O.J. (L 86) 1; Agreement Between the European Community and Canada on Trade in Wines
and Spirit Drinks, 2004 O.J. (L 35) 3; Agreement Between the European Community and the
Republic of South Africa on Trade in Spirits, 2002 O.J. (L 28) 113; Agreement Between the
European Community and the Republic of South Africa on Trade in Wine, 2002 O.J. (L 28) 4.
17. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
18. Blakeney, supra note 1 at 637.
19. Id. at 638.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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TRIPs Agreement is the first such agreement to combine the broad
support of important trading nations and a more significant
international regulation of GIs.
The TRIPs Agreement is binding upon all the member states of the
WTO and thereby includes almost all the relevant markets in the
22
world.
It is certainly one of the most, if not the most, important
international agreements on intellectual property protection, and GIs
have particularly benefited from its enactment. In fact, prior to the
enactment of TRIPs, it was not possible to talk about a comprehensive
global system of protection for GIs. Both the Paris Convention and the
Madrid Agreement covered only a small portion of the subject, and the
Lisbon Agreement, although broader in its scope, suffered from limited
membership, which also hobbled the relevant bilateral agreements.
TRIPs, on the other hand, established a worldwide minimum standard
of protection for GIs.
The following articles define the protection required under the
TRIPs Agreement:

22. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art.1.
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23

Article 22 of the TRIPs Agreement covers all products
24
for which a relationship between quality, reputation or
other characteristics and geographical origin can be
shown, and establishes a standard level of protection
according to which GIs have to be protected in order to
avoid misleading the public and to prevent unfair
25
competition.

23. Id. art. 22.
Protection of Geographical Indications
1. Geographical indications are, for the purposes of this Agreement,
indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or
a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.
2. In respect of geographical indications, Members shall provide the legal
means for interested parties to prevent:
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that
indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical
area other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the
public as to the geographical origin of the good;
(b) any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within the
meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967).
3. A Member shall, ex officio if its legislation so permits or at the request of an
interested party, refuse or invalidate the registration of a trademark which
contains or consists of a geographical indication with respect to goods not
originating in the territory indicated, if use of the indication in the trademark
for such goods in that Member is of such a nature as to mislead the public as to
the true place of origin.
4. The protection under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be applicable against a
geographical indication which, although literally true as to the territory, region
or locality in which the goods originate, falsely represents to the public that the
goods originate in another territory.
Id.
24. It should be noted that because Article 22 provides protection for goods that derive
only their reputation from a particular location and not necessarily also their qualities, the
TRIPs Agreement expands the scope of protection that was established in the Lisbon
Agreement, and includes “indication of origin” together with “appellation of origin.” See
supra Part I.B.
25. The concept of unfair competition relevant in this context is defined by Article
10bis of the Paris Convention.
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26

Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement provides a higher
level of protection for GIs for wines and spirits compared
to the standard established for other products by Article
27
22 of the TRIPs Agreement.
Therefore, subject to a
28
number of exceptions, GIs for wines and spirits have to
be protected even if misuse would not cause the public to
be misled. Also, Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement
29
provides stipulations for homonymous GIs on products
sold in the same markets. In this case, the rule allows for
co-existence so long as some kind of specification is
included to help the consumer distinguish the
homonymous marks. Finally, Article 23(4) of the TRIPs
Agreement prescribes that WTO member states should
undertake negotiations to create a multilateral system of

26. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23.
Additional Protection for Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits
1. Each Member shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent
use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in
the place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying
spirits for spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical
indication in question, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or
the geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by
expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like.
2. The registration of a trademark for wines which contains or consists of a
geographical indication identifying wines or for spirits which contains or
consists of a geographical indication identifying spirits shall be refused or
invalidated, ex officio if a Member's legislation so permits or at the request of
an interested party, with respect to such wines or spirits not having this origin.
3. In the case of homonymous geographical indications for wines, protection
shall be accorded to each indication, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of
Article 22. Each Member shall determine the practical conditions under which
the homonymous indications in question will be differentiated from each other,
taking into account the need to ensure equitable treatment of the producers
concerned and that consumers are not misled.
4. In order to facilitate the protection of geographical indications for wines,
negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPs concerning the
establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of
geographical indications for wines eligible for protection in those Members
participating in the system.
Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. art. 24.
29. Homonymous GIs are indications, which are spelled and pronounced in the same
way, but refer to locations situated in different countries. An example could be the term
“Rioja” for wines coming from Spain or Argentina. See Blakeney, supra note 1, at 643.
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30

•

notification and registration of GIs on wines.
A full
discussion of this point will be the subject of the next
31
Part.
Article 24 of the TRIPs Agreement identifies a number
of exceptions that limit the applicability of articles 22 and
32
23. In particular, the implementation of Articles 22 and

30. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4).
31. See infra Part II.
32. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24.
International Negotiations; Exceptions
1. Members agree to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection
of individual geographical indications under Article 23. The provisions of
paragraphs 4 through 8 below shall not be used by a Member to refuse to
conduct negotiations or to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the
context of such negotiations, Members shall be willing to consider the
continued applicability of these provisions to individual geographical
indications whose use was the subject of such negotiations.
2. The Council for TRIPs shall keep under review the application of the
provisions of this Section; the first such review shall take place within two years
of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Any matter affecting the
compliance with the obligations under these provisions may be drawn to the
attention of the Council, which, at the request of a Member, shall consult with
any Member or Members in respect of such matter in respect of which it has not
been possible to find a satisfactory solution through bilateral or plurilateral
consultations between the Members concerned. The Council shall take such
action as may be agreed to facilitate the operation and further the objectives of
this Section.
3. In implementing this Section, a Member shall not diminish the protection of
geographical indications that existed in that Member immediately prior to the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
4. Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to prevent continued and
similar use of a particular geographical indication of another Member
identifying wines or spirits in connection with goods or services by any of its
nationals or domiciliaries who have used that geographical indication in a
continuous manner with regard to the same or related goods or services in the
territory of that Member either (a) for at least 10 years preceding 15 April 1994
or (b) in good faith preceding that date.
5. Where a trademark has been applied for or registered in good faith, or
where rights to a trademark have been acquired through use in good faith
either:
(a) before the date of application of these provisions in that Member as
defined in Part VI; or
(b) before the geographical indication is protected in its country of origin;
measures adopted to implement this Section shall not prejudice eligibility
for or the validity of the registration of a trademark, or the right to use a
trademark, on the basis that such a trademark is identical with, or similar
to, a geographical indication.
6. Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions in
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23 “shall not prejudice eligibility for or the validity of the
registration of a trademark, or the right to use a
trademark, on the basis that such a trademark is identical
with or similar to,” an existing GI, if the trademark has
been acquired in good faith either: 1) before the date of
application of these provisions in the member state, or 2)
33
before the GI is protected in its country of origin.
The following Parts will provide a full description of the main issues
surrounding the scope and applicability of the aforementioned articles
together with the relevant policy discussion.
II. THE MULTILATERAL REGISTER FOR WINES AND SPIRITS
The international regulation of GIs on products was one of the most
contentious TRIPs related issues at the international negotiations of the
34
World Trade Organization Ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico.

respect of a geographical indication of any other Member with respect to goods
or services for which the relevant indication is identical with the term
customary in common language as the common name for such goods or services
in the territory of that Member. Nothing in this Section shall require a Member
to apply its provisions in respect of a geographical indication of any other
Member with respect to products of the vine for which the relevant indication is
identical with the customary name of a grape variety existing in the territory of
that Member as of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
7. A Member may provide that any request made under this Section in
connection with the use or registration of a trademark must be presented within
five years after the adverse use of the protected indication has become
generally known in that Member or after the date of registration of the
trademark in that Member provided that the trademark has been published by
that date, if such date is earlier than the date on which the adverse use became
generally known in that Member, provided that the geographical indication is
not used or registered in bad faith.
8. The provisions of this Section shall in no way prejudice the right of any
person to use, in the course of trade, that person's name or the name of that
person’s predecessor in business, except where such name is used in such a
manner as to mislead the public.
9. There shall be no obligation under this Agreement to protect geographical
indications which are not or cease to be protected in the country of origin, or
which have fallen into disuse in that country.
Id.
33. Id.
34. The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Cancun from September 10-14,
2003. More information about the meeting is available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Cancun
Conference].
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The November 2001 Declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference
in Doha provided the mandate for negotiations on a range of subjects,
35
including two TRIPs issues. Among these issues was the protection of
GIs, whose debate played “a politically and ideologically divisive role in
the furtherance of TRIPs’ goals to protect intellectual property and
36
global economic interests” and to promote global trade.
The discussion, which evolved as a component of the larger debate
on global agricultural policy, mainly revolves around three points of
contention: (i) the creation of a multilateral register for wines and
spirits, (ii) the extension of the higher level of protection of Article 23 of
the TRIPs Agreement to products other than wines and spirits and (iii)
the EU initiative to regain the exclusive use of certain geographical
37
indication names.
A. Background and Proposals
1. Background
The negotiations regarding the creation of a multilateral register for
wines and spirits began in July 1997 following the enactment of Article
23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement and continued until the Fourth
Ministerial Conference in Doha, which included a mandate for
38
additional negotiations about the protection of GIs in its Declaration.
Since November 2001 some progress was made, but on September 14,
2003, due to the objective impossibility of reaching an agreement on this
and several other issues covered by the meeting, the Cancun Ministerial
39
collapsed.
The talks, however, never really ended as the delegates
have continued to negotiate back in Geneva, looking for solutions that
could finally bring them to a binding agreement before the Hong Kong
40
Ministerial meeting of December 2005.
35. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/ [hereinafter Doha
Ministerial Declaration].
36. Stacy D. Goldberg, Who Will Raise the White Flag? The Battle Between the United
States and the European Union Over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 22 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 107, 110 (2001).
37. Id. at 125-26.
38. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 35.
39. It should be noted, however, that this result certainly was not unexpected to the
WTO delegates, particularly if we consider that none of the intermediate deadlines
established for the negotiations in Doha had been met before Cancun. See Cancun
Conference, supra note 34.
40. See Minutes of the General Council, WT/GC/M/87 (Oct. 4, 2004), available at
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Unfortunately though, the Hong Kong Conference did not produce
the desired results. To the contrary, the six days of talks did very little
41
to resolve the conflicts among the WTO member states. In late July,
2006, the WTO Director General, Pascal Lamy, announced the
42
suspension of the Doha Round. Without much warning, the
43
negotiations resumed in February 2007 and included informal talks
44
within the TRIPs Council about GIs. To better understand the debate
in question and the arguments that have been presented, a brief
description of the most important proposals presented follows.
2. The Proposals for the Multilateral Register
Two main sets of proposals on the creation of a multilateral register
for wines and spirits have been submitted over the years, and they
45
represent the two primary arguments in the negotiations.
The first
46
line of arguments, known as the TRIPs-plus proposal, endorsed by the

http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/M87.doc.
41. See, e.g., Gerald P. O’Driscoll, The Terms of Trade: A Coalition of the Willing?,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2005, at A18; Scott Miller & Greg Hitt, Farm-Aid Pact Averts Failure in
Global Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., Dec.19, 2005, at A3; Guy De Jonquieres & Frances
Williams, WTO Deal Fails to Heal Rifts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at 1.
42. See, e.g., Juliane von Reppert-Bismarck & Greg Hitt, Talks for Global Trade Deal
Collapse, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2006, at A3; Alan Beattie, Several Suspects in Frame for Doha
Murder, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 2006, at 5.
43. BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest (Int’l Ctr. For Trade and Sustainable Dev.),
Feb. 7, 2007, Doha Round Negotiations “Fully” Resume; Lamy Sees Favourable Conditions
for Deal, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-02-07/story1.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2008).
44. BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest (Int’l Ctr. For Trade and Sustainable Dev.),
Feb. 21, 2007, Brief TRIPs Council Gives Way to Informals, available at http://www.ictsd.org/
weekly/07-02-21/story1.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
45. The proposals here mentioned have been revised several times over the years and
also have been joined to other proposals presented by other WTO countries. Therefore, the
present analysis is just a schematic summary of the relevant concepts.
46. This proposal represents the final version of a number of prior attempts to provide
a possible solution to the implementation of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement. Special
Session of the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Communication
from
the
European
Communities:
Geographical
Indications,
WT/GC/W/547/TN/C/W/26/TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005). In July 1999, the EU submitted for
the first time a proposal on the issue of the creation of a multilateral register for wines and
spirits. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication
from the European Communities and their Member States: Proposal for a Multilateral Register
of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPs
Agreement, IP/C/W/107 (July 28, 1998). This proposal was then revised in June 2000 to
accommodate the considerations presented by the other WTO Member states on the 1999
version. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication
from the European Communities and their Member States: Implementation of Article 23.4 of
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European Community, proposes that the registration at the WTO level
would establish a “presumption” (that can be challenged on certain
47
grounds) that the GI is to be protected in all other countries.
Under this proposal, each WTO Member state seeking international
protection of its GIs would have to notify the WTO Secretariat. Once
all relevant notifications have been collected, the WTO Secretariat
would publish and communicate them to other WTO Member states,
which would have eighteen months to examine the publication and
present related questions. During that period the WTO Member states
also have the right to challenge the other states’ GI registrations thereby
undertaking bilateral negotiations to solve possible disputes. The GI in
question will not be officially registered until the settlement of such
negotiations, and, in the event of a successful challenge, it will be
48
permanently excluded from the system. Opposition to the registration
the TRIPs Agreement Relating to the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification
and Registration of Geographical Indications, IP/C/107/Rev. 1 (June 22, 2000). Subsequently,
Hungary further developed the EU proposal and submitted its own version in 2001. Council
for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from Hungary:
Opposition/Challenge Procedure in the Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of
Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/234 (Dec. 11, 2000). Then, the EU incorporated the
modifications proposed by Hungary in its May 2001 version. Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from Hungary: Incorporation of
Elements Raised by Hungary in IP/C/W/234 into the Proposal by the European communities
and Their Member States on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and
Registration of Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/255 (May 3, 2001). Finally, the version
which is summarized here in its most significant aspects has been prepared and circulated in
preparation of the Hong Kong Ministerial. Special Session of the Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from the European Communities:
Geographical Indications, WT/GC/W/547/TN/C/W/26/TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005). The
aforementioned documents are available at http://www.wto.org/ under the “Official
Documents” link.
47. See TRIPs: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/TRIPs_e/gi_background_e.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
48. Special Session of the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Communication from the European Communities: Geographical Indications,
WT/GC/W/547/TN/C/W/26/TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005). This provision is the result of a
modification added by Hungary to the 2000 version of the EU proposal. In that particular
version, the EU suggested a system in which once the eighteen months elapsed all the
notified GIs would be inserted in the multilateral register no matter if they were subject to
challenges by some states. The only legal effect of the opposition would be the consequent
lack of protection of the challenged GI in the territory of the state that presented the
opposition. All the other states would still be under the obligation to provide the protection
established by Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to the registered GIs no matter if
challenged by other states. As underscored by the proposal presented by Hungary, the need
for certainty in the international trade and uniformity of treatment in all the WTO Member
states would make this system quite ineffective, as the same GI would receive different levels
of protection in different states with the possibilities of consequent distortions of trade (which
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of a certain GI can only be brought by a WTO Member state on certain
grounds, such as non-compliance with the definition of GIs in Article 22
49
of the TRIPs Agreement or the fact that the GI is a generic name.
Thus far, the EU proposal is endorsed by “Bulgaria, Cuba, Egypt,
Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein,
Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey,
50
and Venezuela.”
The second main set of proposals known as the “joint paper,” was
51
initially submitted by the United States and Japan in February 1999,
52
revised by Canada and Chile in July 1999, and further refined in
53
54
September 2002 and April 2004 with the support of a number of
other countries. The final version submitted on April 2005 consists of a
voluntary system in which each WTO Member state would initially
communicate the list of GIs protected in its territory to the WTO, which
would then register these GIs in a database maintained by the WTO

is exactly what the TRIPs Agreement was aimed to avoid). Hungary therefore proposed a
system whose effects would be erga omnes and, as explained in the text, would determine the
rejection of registration of all successfully challenged GIs. Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from Hungary: Incorporation of
Elements Raised by Hungary in IP/C/W/234 into the Proposal by the European communities
and Their Member States on the Establishment of a Multilateral System Notification and
Registration of Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/255 (May 3, 2001).
49. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(6).
50. The support by these countries has been conditioned on a bona fide undertaking of
the negotiations on the extension of the level of protection of Article 23 of the TRIPs
Agreement to other products of their interest. BERNARD O’CONNOR, THE LAW OF
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, 396 (Cameron May 2004).
51. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication
from Japan and the United States: Proposal for a Multilateral System for Notification and
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the
TRIPs Agreement, IP/C/W/133 (Mar. 11, 1999).
52. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication
from Canada, Chile, Japan and the United States: Proposal for a Multilateral System for
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPs
Agreement, IP/C/W/133/Rev.1 (July 26, 1999).
53. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication
from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Namibia, New Zealand, Philippines,
Chinese Taipei, and the United States: Proposal for a Multilateral System for Notification and
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the
TRIPs Agreement, TN/IP/W/5 (Oct. 22, 2002).
54. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication
from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, New Zealand and the United
States: Joint Proposal for a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of
Geographical Indications for Wine and Spirits, TN/IP/W/9 (Apr. 13, 2004)

214 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

[12:2

55

itself.
In turn, the participating governments would have to consult
the database when making GI protection decisions in accordance with
their national law, whereas non-participating members would be
56
encouraged, but not obliged, to consult the database. Given that there
are no legal repercussions connected to the insertion of a GI in the
proposed database, which is merely a source of information for
participating countries, no opposition procedure has been included in
the “joint paper” proposal. This system is supported by Argentina,
Australia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
57
Honduras, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, and Chinese Taipei.
Both proposals suffer from major weaknesses and, in an attempt to
overcome them, Hong Kong and the International Trademark
Association (INTA) submitted an additional proposal and a position
paper in April 2003. Their proposals represent a middle ground
between the two major trading blocks described above. The Hong
Kong proposal brings the protection of GIs back to the national courts
58
of WTO member states. Hong Kong proposes a registration system at
the WTO level in which member states may communicate their
respective GIs. Notifications will only be examined on formal grounds
at the WTO level and entry into the Register will create prima facie
evidence of ownership, conformity to the definition included in Article
22 of the TRIPs Agreement, and existence of the protection of the
59
specific GI in the country of origin. This presumption may then be
overcome in proceedings before national courts, tribunals, or
administrative bodies whose decisions would be based on domestic law,
and thus, would only have territorial effects.

55. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Submission by
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras,
Mexico, New Zealand, Chinese Taipei and the United States: Proposed Draft TRIPs Council
Decision on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of
Geographical Indications for Wine and Spirits, p. 3, TN/IP/W/10 (Apr. 1, 2005).
56. Id.
57. O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 397; see also Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Communication by Paraguay: Addendum to Proposed Draft
TRIPs Council Decision on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wine and Spirits, p. 1, TN/IP/W/10/Add.1 (Nov.
18, 2005).
58. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication
from Hong Kong, China: Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical
Indications Under Article 23.4 of the TRIPs Agreement, pp. 6, 7, TN/IP/W/8 (Apr. 23, 2003).
59. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(9).
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Similarly, INTA’s
position paper recommends a system of
intellectual
property
rights
protection
that
includes
a
notification/registration system based on the existence at the national
level of application/registration and refusal/opposition procedures. The
national courts would examine each registration while particularly
taking into account the existence of prior rights.
The final
communication of successfully registered GIs at the domestic level to
other WTO Member states would be made through an international
60
body created by the WTO for this purpose.
B. The TRIPs Agreement
WTO Member states are divided on the issue of the creation of a
multilateral register for wines and spirits. A number of states,
particularly developing countries, support the EU proposal and have
expressed to the TRIPs Council a desire that the registration system and
the higher level of protection provide by Article 23 of the TRIPs
61
Agreement should be extended to many other products. The other
side of the debate has been presented by the United States, Australia,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Argentina, Canada, Chile, and others.
These countries believe that the system of registration proposed by the
62
EU will be expensive and that there is no evidence that the actual level
of protection provided by Article 22 of the TRIPs Agreement does not
confer the benefit that the other countries expect to achieve through a
63
more stringent protection of GIs.
In order to increase the level of understanding of the international
debate on this issue, it is necessary to refer to the TRIPs Agreement
itself and to provide an analysis of its relevant portions as well as a brief
overview of the negotiations that led to its enactment. This will
elucidate both what the WTO Member states agreed upon by entering
the TRIPs Agreement and the way in which such an agreement came

60. See International Trademark Association, Establishment of a Multilateral System of
Notification and the Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Pursuant to
TRIPs Article 23(4), available at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/inta_e.doc.
61. Felix Addor & Alexandra Grazioli, Geographical Indications Beyond Wine and
Spirits. A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical Indications in the WTO/TRIPs
Agreement, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 865, 866 (2002).
62. Id.
63. Steven A. Bowers, Location, Location, Location: The Case Against Extending
Geographical Indication Protection Under the TRIPs Agreement, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 129, 154
(2003).
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about, allowing the gathering of useful information on how the present
controversy should be addressed.
1. The Negotiations on the Protection of GIs before the TRIPs
Agreement
As with many other issues subject to international agreements, the
regulation of GIs in TRIPs was the result of a compromise among
conflicting economic, political, and legal interests. Nevertheless, what
can be considered unique to this particular “compromise,” as compared
to the one reached over other forms of Intellectual Property (IP) in the
TRIPs Agreement, is the size of the gap that the different negotiating
countries had to fill in order to agree to the present regime of
international regulation of GIs. Indeed, many countries at the
beginning of the negotiations, which started with general discussions
about the objectives to be reached and principles of international law to
64
be applied, did not have a clear understanding of the nature, specific
characteristics, and relevance of GIs and, quite openly, questioned
whether it was “appropriate to deal with this particular form of IP in the
65
In their opinion, there were no trade-related
Negotiating Group.”
aspects connected with them or, at least, none that could not be resolved
66
through the international regulation of trademarks.
64. This initial stage, which started in April 1987, was then followed by the submission
of proposals by the different delegations, both on specific issues and on more general
subjects, which constituted the basis for the subsequent discussions made by the Negotiating
Group in 1988 and 1989. The final draft agreement of 1991 was the result of such discussions
and of the additional proposals submitted in 1990. Minutes of the Negotiating Group on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods
(“TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes”), MTN.GNG/NG11/1.
65. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/9 (Oct. 13, 1988).
66. In particular the delegation from Japan at this early stage of the negotiations
expressed concerns about this issue and explained that its proposal did not include GIs, as
this form of IP was still under study by its government. It is important to keep in mind in
these regards that the negotiations leading to the TRIPs Agreement developed within the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) framework (and in particular within the
Uruguay Round which was launched at Punta del Este in 1986) as a measure to eliminate
trade distortion caused by the excessive, insufficient, or absence of protection of IP. Indeed,
as made clear by the Chairman (Ambassador Lars E.R. Anell from Sweden) in the March 25,
1987 meeting,
the protection of [IPR], including the way in which such protection was accorded
and enforced, was an issue of significant and growing importance in international
trade and economic relations. International trade in goods increasingly involved the
international exchange of technologies, creative activity and other subjects of [IPR].
Some of [the] participants stressed the importance they attached to satisfactory
results in this area, which were necessary in order to achieve an acceptable overall
balance of results of the Uruguay Round.
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On the other side of the spectrum were other countries, such as the
EU and Switzerland, for which the protection of GIs was of extreme
significance given the long-term establishment of GIs in their economies
and legal tradition. They underscored the importance of this particular
form of IP for their governments and noted on more than one occasion
that they “could not see the logic in accepting that GATT could deal
with some substantive standards [of IP] . . . and, at the same time,
67
claiming that other intellectual property rights could not be discussed.”
Indeed, according to them, “geographical indications were only one
68
category among a number of types of intellectual property rights.”
In between these two positions were those countries, such as
Australia, Chile, and the United States, which although familiar with
GIs, had a different legal tradition. These countries provided protection
for these geographic terms through trademark law, unfair competition
and certification marks and not through a sui generis GI law. Many of
them had significant economic interests in these kinds of identifiers that,
in their territory, consisted either of trademarks or generic terms, and
thus considered the position held by the EU and Switzerland to be
69
Indeed, these countries’ main objection to the EU
overreaching.
proposal was the issue of how to deal with generic terms and trademarks
70
incorporating geographic terms originating from other countries.
These concerns were made clear by Australia in 1989 when one of its
representatives, while comparing the EU and Australian proposals, said
that “his delegation supported the protection of [GIs] including
appellations of origin and could agree widely with the proposal of the

TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/1 (Apr. 10, 1987). Nevertheless, some
other participants, particularly from the developing countries, pointed out that the goal of the
negotiations was not to provide a substantive international regulation of IP (which was
instead an issue on which at that time WIPO was working) that could harmonize the domestic
law of the different WTO Member states, but only to agree upon a uniform solution to those
issues that indeed had an impact on the international trade. In other words, it was clear since
the beginning that the TRIPs Agreement had to deal only with those negative effects on trade
that resulted from “anomalous” protection of IPR. See Meeting of March 25, 1987, TRIPs
Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/1 (Apr. 10, 1987); TRIPs Negotiating Group
Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/8 (Aug. 29, 1988). Notwithstanding this initial objective, the
negotiations had the result to provide the world’s most compressive and substantive
international agreement on IPR.
67. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/9 (Oct. 13, 1988).
68. Id.
69. This was particularly true for wine producing countries, such as Australia and Chile
whose economic interest in specific GIs was equal to one of their European counterparts.
TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/14 (Sept. 12, 1989).
70. Id.
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Communities; the differences between his country [of origin] and the
Community on this matter [were] essentially in regard to names that
71
had become truly generic.” Indeed, according to him “many of the
terms in question no longer reflected a geographical indication but had
become associated with a general set of characteristics that pertained to
72
a particular product.” Finally, he added that, “[a]s long as there was
no intention, or effect, of deceiving the consumer, his delegation did not
73
consider it necessary to protect names that had become truly generic.”
This position was also shared by the United States, whose
representative shortly thereafter pointed out that “his country . . .
recogni[z]ed . . . that over time terms would become so widely used as to
74
become generic” and that therefore there were concerns in his
delegation about the establishment in the TRIPs Agreement of a level
of protection for GIs that was too high.
The EU representative on the other hand “emphasi[z]ed the major
trade distortions and impediments that were arising in his view because
of widespread [misuse] of geographical indications, in particular . . . of
names of geographical areas located on European territory which
represented products specific to the natural and/or human environment
75
in which they were elaborated.” He felt that “a considerable number
of other countries, both developed and developing, had interests in this
matter. The products affected were often processed agricultural
76
products.” He also hoped that “countries which stood to benefit from
being able to exploit more fully a comparative advantage in agriculture
as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations . . . would recogni[z]e the
legitimacy of the Community’s desire to benefit fully from its own
comparative advantage, which [consisted] particularly in the
accumulation of know-how, experience and in its specific conditions of
77
soil and climate.” Finally, he pointed out that “[t]he essence of what
the Community was seeking was adequate protection against unfair use
by third parties of the results of the work, investment and goodwill
78
generated by its people[].”

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The positions of the different delegations over the regulation of GIs
continued to be substantially irreconcilable during 1988 and 1989 and
79
became even more problematic towards the beginning of 1990.
Indeed, as the deadline for the conclusion of the negotiations
approached, the tension in the negotiations increased and a number of
80
new legal texts were submitted. The first was that of the EU, which
was introduced at the meeting of April 1990 by a representative of its
delegation, which underscored that “[t]he Community had decided to
reiterate its previously tabled proposal on this matter, in the hope that
other participants would make constructive attempts to address the
81
trade problems in this area.”
He also stressed “the unacceptable
nature of the present situation in certain jurisdictions, mainly created by
the absence of adequate protection of appellations of origin in a few
countries to the advantage of a relatively small number of producers,
and to the detriment of the legitimate producers of such appellations in
82
the Community or in other wine producing countries.”
It became clear at that point that no agreement could have been
reached with the EU without the inclusion in the TRIPs Agreement of
some level of protection for GIs that could have been considered
83
The EU proposal was
satisfactory from the Community perspective.
79. The agreement was supposed to be reached by the autumn of 1990, but soon it
became clear that it was very unlikely this goal was going to be met as expressly underscored
by the Chairman of the negotiations when in August 1990 he commented upon the
consultations and said:
The consultations had been positive and held in a very constructive atmosphere . . .
[but they] had not served to narrow significantly the gap on points where there were
differences of substance. The number of such points, their complexity and the
extent of the gap between participants in respect of many of them were such that the
task of reaching an agreement in the Autumn remained a formidable one.
TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/23 (Aug. 22, 1990).
80. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from the European Communities:
Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/
W/68 (Mar. 29, 1990).
81. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/20 (Apr. 24, 1990).
82. Id.
83. Indeed such an agreement was highly desired by more than one country. In
particular, the United States was suffering heavy losses from the absence of adequate
protection of IPR abroad.
The industries in such sectors as computer software and microelectronics,
entertainment, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology, had become
concerned about the loss of commercial opportunities abroad. In 1987 a survey by
the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) confirmed, on the basis of
public hearing held and questionnaires administered, that the United States firms
were loosing [sic] some 50 billion dollars, owing to lack of protection abroad of
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therefore “followed by a series of similar drafts of complete texts of
84
TRIPs Agreement, submitted in May 1990 by the United States,
85
86
Switzerland, and Japan, all of which ‘borrowed substantially from the
87
Community’s text.’” Also in May 1990, for the first time a group of
88
developing countries submitted a proposal. All the aforementioned
drafts included provisions that addressed GIs that, to use the words of
the EU representative, “still fell short of the Community’s ambitions,”
89
but without doubt represented progress towards a possible agreement.
Subsequently the Chairman of the negotiations produced a
composite text, that summarized the relevant points and alternatives of
90
the proposals mentioned above. This document represented the basis
on which the negotiations, which anticipated the Brussels meeting of
December 1990, took place. The Brussels meeting produced tangible
91
results and the Draft Final Act was issued by December 1991. “[T]he
subsequent discussions did not yield many substantive provisions
92
different from [the one included in the December 1991 draft],” which
therefore is very close to the agreement adopted in Marrakesh in 1994.
As for the specific regulation of GIs, it can be said that the final
version of the TRIPs Agreement reflects the dynamics and struggles of

Intellectual Property.
A. O. Adede, The Political Economy of the TRIPs Agreement: Origins and History of the
Negotiations (2001), http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2001-07-30/Adede.pdf ¶¶ 3-4.
84. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from the United States: Draft
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70
(May 11, 1990).
85. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Switzerland: Draft Amendment
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on the Protection of Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/73 (May 14, 1990).
86. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Japan: Main Elements of a
Legal Text for TRIPs, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/74 (May 15, 1990).
87. Adede, supra note 83, ¶ 20.
88. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71
(May 14, 1990).
89. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/21 (June 22, 1990).
90. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Chairman’s Report to the GNG: Status of Work in the
Negotiating Group, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 1990).
91. Adede, supra note 83, ¶ 25.
92. Id.
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the negotiations over this issue, as it consists of a hybrid discipline in
which identifiers with similar characteristics for similar products are
treated in substantially different ways with no logical justification
supporting it. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous Part, under the
93
GIs for wines and spirits enjoy a much higher
TRIPs Agreement,
94
level of protection than GIs for other potentially identical products.
The only plausible explanation for this result can be found in the
political pressures exercised on this issue during the negotiations by the
EU on one side and the resistance of the other countries adversely
affected by a stringent GI regulation on the other.
This result is even more apparent if the drafts of the agreement that
were submitted during 1990 by the different delegations are compared.
A progressive spectrum of levels of protection for this kind of identifier,
that go from a very broad regime whose scope covers all types of
95
products and provides protection for generic terms, to a very narrow
regime in which GIs are protected only if their use misled the public,
can be identified. The compromise was reached somewhere in the
middle of this spectrum, and GIs for wines and spirits have particularly
benefited from it.
Also, it can be noted that two significant provisions that were
96
present in the EU’s draft disappeared from the final version of the
agreement. They referred to the issue of generic terms and provided, on
one side, for WTO Member states to establish “[a]ppropriate measures .
. . under national law . . . to prevent [GIs] from developing into a
97
designation of generic character” and, on the other, that it was
“understood that appellations of origin for products of the vine . . .
98
[were] not . . . susceptible to develop into generic designations.” Many
countries strongly opposed these provisions and questioned the
99
significance of distinguishing wine from other products.
93. See supra Part I.C.
94. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 22-23.
95. In particular, see the EU proposal under Protective Measures. Negotiating Group
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods, Communication from the European Community: Draft Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 (Mar. 29, 1990).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Chairman’s Report to the GNG: Status of
Work in the Negotiating Group, MTN.GNG/NG11W/76 (July 23, 1990); TRIPs Negotiating
Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/27 (Nov. 14, 1990).
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Finally, the initial EU proposal included under “Restricted Acts”
that “any usurpation, imitation or evocation, even where the true origin
of the product [was] indicated or the appellation or designation [was]
used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as ‘kind’, ‘type’,
100
‘style’, ‘imitation’ or the like.” In that context, this provision extended
to all GIs no matter the kind of product to which they are associated,
whereas in the TRIPs Agreement, a very similar rule is established in
101
Article 23, but only for wines and spirits.
Ultimately, it looks clear that the EU, in the last moments of the
negotiations, had to give up some of its goals regarding the international
protection of GIs in order to obtain the significant coverage enjoyed
today by those GIs on products that probably are among the most
important for the Community’s economy and for which the connection
with the particular place of origin and their qualities is more evident:
wines and spirits.
2. Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement
As part of the compromise reached on the general regulation of
102
GIs, a provision for undertaking negotiations in the TRIPs Council to
103
establish a multilateral system of notification and registration for wine
was included in Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement.
In order to facilitate the protection of geographical indications for
wines, negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPs

100. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from the European Community:
Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG
/NG11/W/68 (Mar. 29, 1990).
101. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23.
102. See supra Part II.B.1.
103. It is important to note that the Doha Declaration extended the negotiations on
this point and included “spirits” (which are not part of Article 23(4) together with “wine” in
the scope of the multilateral register). In its relevant portion, the Doha Declaration says:
“[w]ith a view to completing the work started in the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (Council for TRIPs) on the implementation of Art. 23.4, we
agree to negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and regulation of
geographical indication for wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference.” Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 35. The main supporters of the
inclusion of “spirits” in the Doha mandate for the present negotiations were the United
States and Mexico on account of their Tequila and Bourbon production. David Vivas-Eugui,
Negotiations on Geographical Indications in the TRIPs Council and Their Effects on the WTO
Agricultural Negotiations—Implications for Developing Countries and the Case of Venezuela,
4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 703, 711 (2001).
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concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of
notification and registration of geographical indications for wines
eligible for protection in those Members participating in the
104
system.
From a comparison of the final version of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs
Agreement with the respective provisions included in the drafts
submitted by the different WTO Member states in 1990, several
significant elements can be identified that can facilitate the
understanding of what is required by TRIPs on this issue. In particular,
the composite text submitted by the Chairman of the negotiations in
105
July 1990, which, as mentioned above, represents a summary of the
different positions of the WTO Member states right before the
negotiations that brought the 1991 Draft Final Act, can be used to
106
Indeed, under the section
isolate few but very significant points.
“International Register” the draft reports that:
PARTIES agree to cooperate with a view to establish an
international register for protected geographical indications, in
order to facilitate the protection of geographical indications
including appellations of origin. In appropriate cases the use of
documents certifying the right to use the relevant geographical
107
indication should be provided for.
Once again it is possible to conclude that until the very end of the
negotiations the register was intended for all kind of GIs and not solely
for those related to wines and spirits. Therefore, this significant
limitation introduced in the final version of the article had a high
probability of being counterbalanced. This idea is reinforced in the
introduction of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement by the term
“multilateral,” a term that was absent in all the drafts that preceded the
108
final agreement.
In fact, the inclusion of such a term indicates a
precise intent of the WTO Member states to provide for a register with
those specific effects that are normally associated with the use of the

104. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4) (emphasis added).
105. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Chairman’s Report to the GNG: Status of Work in the
Negotiating Group, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 1990).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
108. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4).
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109

word “multilateral” in the WTO context. Indeed, the “meaning of the
term ‘multilateral’ can only be defined . . . by contrasting it with the
world ‘plurilateral.’ In the context of the WTO, ‘plurilateral’ is
understood as referring to a system in which . . . [the prescribed
obligation and rights only bind signatory countries]. Conversely,
‘multilateral’ systems are understood to be instruments by which all
110
Members are bound.”
This conclusion is supported once again by the derestricted
documents of the TRIPs negotiations in which on more than one
occasion the participants expressed their “will to elaborate a solution
that would be applicable to all participants—a truly multilateral
111
solution” or by underlining the need for the establishment of a
multilateral process “in absence of [which] . . . the alternative would be
a situation where the subjective assessments of individual contracting
112
parties come into conflict with each other . . . ,” have specifically
intended something that required the involvement of all the WTO
Member states and not just of those willing to participate. Therefore, it
can be said that by entering the TRIPs Agreement, the WTO Member
States agreed to negotiate the establishment of a system of registration
for wines and spirits in which the insertion of a GI creates the binding
“effects” of having the registered identifier protected in all the WTO
Members.
Finally, further analyzing the remaining portion of Article 23(4) of
the TRIPs Agreement, it should be noted that the required system must
be a “voluntary” one. This is because of the presence of the expression:
113
“in those Members participating in the system.” This must nevertheless
be interpreted in accordance with the “multilateral” provision of the
previous part. The consequence is that the TRIPs Agreement requires a
system in which the WTO Member states are free to participate, while
also being subject to the behavior of the other countries. In other
words, TRIPs calls for a system in which registering a GI guarantees it
109. It is worth underlining once more that these “effects” were totally absent in the
previous drafts as the expression “international register” could refer for example to a simple
plurilateral system of registration which does not involve the production of binding effect in
all the WTO member states but only in those who decide to participate in the system of
registration.
110. J.M. Cortes Martin, The WTO TRIPs Agreement – The Battle Between the Old and
the New World Over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
287, 294 (2004).
111. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/8 (Aug. 29, 1988).
112. Id. at 6.
113. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4).
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the level of protection established by Article 23 of the TRIPs
Agreement in all the WTO Member states, no matter whether the
country in which such protection is sought has decided to participate in
114
the system by developing and registering their own GIs.
From the previous discussion, it is therefore possible to conclude
that the U.S. proposal for the implementation of Article 23(4) of the
TRIPs Agreement cannot be accepted because it falls short of the
specific requirement of the relevant provision of the treaty. This is
because it does not establish a system which, although voluntary in its
participation, establishes the same legal “effects” in all the WTO
member states.
This conclusion is reinforced by the additional fact that Article 23(4)
of the TRIPs Agreement, in defining the required system, uses the
terms “notification and registration.” This suggests that a system that
simply requires notification, such as the system proposed by the United
States, is not enough. This is because the act of registering something in
a registry implies more than the mere conveyance of information
because it “puts the public ‘on notice’ that the registrant is asserting a
115
claim.” Indeed, the “registration of information in a register is linked
116
to the granting of rights,”
whereas the insertion of the same
information in a database does not necessarily have the same “force,”
and thus, it can be concluded that the U.S. proposal on this matter is not
acceptable.
Conversely, the Hong Kong proposal should be rejected because it
lets the national courts decide issues regarding the registration of GIs on
wines and spirits in each specific case would expose those GIs to the
great risk of a substantial disparity of treatment in different WTO
member states. This result does not appear to be consistent with the
117
purpose “to facilitate the protection of geographical indications for
118
wines [and spirits]” as well as the “multilateral” requirement discussed
above as specified in Article 23(4).

114. See id.
115. See UNU-IAS Report, The Role of Registers and Database in the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge: A Comparative Analysis, available at http://www.ias.unu.edu/binaries
/UNUIAS_TKRegistersReport.pdf, at 11 [hereinafter UNU-IAS Report].
116. It is important to underscore here that “[a]lthough the registration serves to
secure the recognition of . . . relevant rights the register does not itself grant rights, but rather
record such rights.” Id.
117. A uniform system of registration will reduce the level of uncertainty about GIs
and thus will ultimately facilitate their protection. See also infra Part II.C.1.
118. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4).
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INTA’s proposal is also problematic because it relies on the
subsistence at the national level of application/registration systems
instead of providing for the establishment of some kind of uniform
mechanism at the international level devoted to serve the specific
119
purpose described in Article 23(4).
Indeed, this solution cannot be
considered an effective one, which is clear if the different consequences
determined by the introduction of the system of registration are
considered. In particular, it is necessary to examine and distinguish the
consequences that would occur in the event the registration is made at
the international level (perhaps with a WTO office), or at the domestic
level, where each state will have to adapt existing administrative
systems. For some states the second option might not represent a
problem as they might already have an appropriate legal infrastructure
that could easily be used for this purpose, but for some other states, it
might require considerable efforts and resources to incorporate the new
mechanism of registration. Therefore, the registration system would
ultimately produce different consequences in each of WTO member
states. Producers in certain countries would have easy access to
registration and would register their GIs promptly and effectively, and
other producers in other countries would have to wait substantially
longer. Eventually these producers could decide to “defect” and suffer
the obvious consequent economic damages.
It is therefore possible to conclude that the proposal presented by
120
the EU, at least to the extent of the elements discussed above, appears

119. See id.
120. It is important to mention that after the issuance of the report of the WTO panel,
See Panel Report, Complaint by the United States, European Communities – Protection of
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs,
WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005), the EU proposal has been subject to strong criticism because
of the substantial similarity between the opposition procedure of the EU GI Regulation,
based on the ground of the “absence of protection in the country of origin,” and the
correspondent procedure included in what was, at that time, the latest version of the EU
proposal.
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Communication from Hungary, Incorporation of Elements Raised by Hungary in IP/C/W/2344
into the Proposal by the European Communities and Their Member States on the
Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical
Indications, WT/IP/C/W/255 (May 3, 2001). As a consequence, on June 14, 2005, the EU
presented a new version of its proposal for the establishment of the multilateral register in
which the aforementioned ground for opposition has not been included. Council Report,
Communication from the European Communities, TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005). To better
understand the dynamic of this episode, a quick digression on the controversy about the EU
GI regulation is useful. In June 1999, the United States, joined by “Australia, Sri Lanka, New
Zealand and Mexico,” requested WTO dispute consultations on the EU GI regulation
2081/92 (subsequently amended by Regulation 692/2003). Request for Consultation by the
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121

to be the one that best fits the requirement of Article 23(4); therefore,
the EU proposal should be preferred for its implementation.
Generally, the TRIPs Agreement and the analysis of the
negotiations made above can be interpreted to show that the WTO
Member states are obligated to negotiate the establishment of some
kind of register for wines and spirits whose operation would produce
binding effects on all of them. This result should not be changed unless
it can be shown that a different system of implementation, such as the
one proposed by the United States, is more efficient in achieving the
aforementioned purpose of facilitating the protection of GIs for wines
and spirits in all the WTO Member states. This is because there are
significant direct and indirect costs associated with the renegotiations of
this provision that are particularly evident if one considers the
disastrous results of the Cancun meeting and the negotiations that
122
followed until today.
Indeed, in this specific case, the risk of others
United States, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS/74/1 (June 1, 1999). The EU
was on the other hand supported by “Hungary, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Bulgaria,
Turkey, Malta, Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia and Taiwan” (Hungary, Czech Republic,
Slovenia and Slovakia are now members of the EU). O’Connor, supra note 50, at 147. The
United States challenged the EU GI Regulation primarily on the grounds related to the
“reciprocity” provision of the EU regulation that allows the EU refusal to register GIs from
third countries, which are WTO Member, unless the same protection as in the EU is offered.
Id. It was claimed that this provision is “inconsistent with national treatment and most
favored nation obligation under both the TRIPs and the GATT agreement.” Id. The WTO
panel found that the “reciprocity” provision included in Article 12(1) of the EU GI
Regulation provides that non-EU-Member states must give guarantees identical or
equivalent to those required to determine compliance to the required specification—for
example, the description of the product, the definition of geographical area, the elements
providing a link with the geographical environment and reference to the inspection structure]
is "inconsistent with Article 3(1) of the TRIPs Agreement, which basically requires foreign
and domestic products (in this case identifier on products) to be subject to the same
treatment. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3(1). The Panel recommended that the EU
bring the regulation into conformity with the TRIPs Agreement by for example amending the
Regulation so as for those conditions not to apply to the producers for registration of GIs
located in other WTO Members. TRIPs Council, Special Session, Discussion of the
Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Regulation of Geographical
Indication for Wines and Spirits: Compilation of Issues and Points, TN/IP/W/7 (May 23,
2003).
121. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4).
122. It is not suggested that the result of the deadlock of the negotiations in Cancun
was entirely caused by the lack of agreement on the creation of the multilateral register for
wines and spirits. However, it can certainly be said that the nature of the negotiations over
GIs that preceded Cancun did not contribute to the creation of a favorable climate for
negotiations on other subjects. Indeed, another “hot” issue in the negotiation about GIs is
represented by the fact that the EU is presently reclaiming the exclusive use of certain GIs
even if they are generic terms or trademarks in other WTO countries. See O’CONNOR, supra
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being retaliated against in international negotiations is very high by
those countries potentially adversely affected by a change of the
required system. The international regulation of GIs has been the result
of a difficult process that required a tenuous balance of power and
economic interests on the sides of all the interested countries. In this
context, the renegotiation of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement
could be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the validity of the
overall GI system that was established by the introduction of Articles 22
to 24 of the TRIPs Agreement and not just as an alternative way of
implementing it.
C. Final Considerations
As described above, the required system for the implementation of
Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement consists of a register whose
operation has binding effects in all WTO Member states. Also, the
previous section covered that this conclusion should not be disregarded
unless a more efficient system, which would justify a change in the
agreement, could be identified. It is therefore necessary to consider and
compare the costs related to the proposed systems and the respective
ability of the system to facilitate the protection of GIs for wines and
123
spirits as explicated in Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement.
1. Brief Analysis of the Proposed Systems
Determination of the costs required by the proposed systems is a
very difficult task, mainly because of the substantial absence of reliable
data that could provide a conclusive answer about which of them is the
most expensive, either in the event of implementation at the
international level, or at the domestic level in all the WTO Member
States. Therefore, in order to determine which system is most efficient,
it is necessary to analyze the function that must be performed by the
proposed system. One way to perform this task is through the
comparison of the proposed systems with similar situations in which
either a register or a database has been adopted to achieve similar goals.
note 50, at 57. This EU initiative was presented for the first time during the agricultural
negotiation and created great disappointment among some participants that considered the
discussion of this issue inappropriate in that context, and asked to bring back to the
negotiations on IP subjects the regulation of GIs. See id. This episode is indeed relevant for
the purpose discussed here because it shows the deep interconnection that exists among the
different subjects of the negotiations and the potential for the exercise of political pressure
among different areas.
123. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4).
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In this regard, the database proposed by the United States for the
implementation of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement appears to be
very similar to the one adopted at the domestic level by a number of
developing countries, such as India and China, in order to improve the
international protection of their traditional knowledge (TK).
In order to inform patent officers around the world (particularly in
the Western countries) of the existence of their “prior art,” several
124
countries created “traditional knowledge databases (TKDs) to collect
125
their innovation heritage.”
These databases are “offered” to patent
officers worldwide in the hope of improving their knowledge regarding
claims of novelty by companies seeking a patent in a particular country.
Unfortunately though, the risk of TKDs being disregarded is very high
because, as mentioned above, they are only offered for consultation to
126
Indeed,
the patent officers who are potentially free to ignore them.
several critiques have been made about the ability of TKDs to facilitate
protection of TK, most of which refer to the fact that patent officers
around the world do not feel obliged to consult any of the existing
databases on this subject. In particular, it has been noted that “those
patent offices which have received training and are aware of the issue
involved or have been blamed in the past for same wrong decisions are
now sensitive to this problem. However, this is just a handful of
127
them.”

124. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1357 (2004). “China offers a Traditional Chinese Medicine Patents
Database”; India "has created a Traditional Knowledge Library; and the World Bank
produced a database to collect African and other regional indigenous knowledge. Id. at 135758.
125. Id. at 1357.
126. Although it is true that no matter what the patent officers do in relation to TKDs,
litigants will still be able to use the information included in these databases as evidence of
“prior art.” Id. at 1357. It is therefore important to underscore that this result will be
available only to those parties that can afford to undertake a patent litigation. Indeed, the
costs of this kind of litigation could represent a significant barrier particularly for the parties
coming from developing countries.
127. Email from Pravin Anand, Managing Partner of Anand Anand Advocates of New
Delhi, to the author (Feb. 17, 2005, 13:15:45 PST) (on file with author). In order to gather
more information about the efficiency of TKDs for this article, Mr. Pravin Anand was
contacted by email and then gave the reported opinion on the use of databases to protect TK.
Mr. Anand is a specialist in the area of IP and has been affiliated with several associations
relevant in this field. He has been “Chairman of the IPR Promotion Advisory Committee
(IPAC) set up by the Ministry of Information Technology . . . , Government of India;
Member of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Protection of Rights of holders of indigenous
knowledge; . . . Member of INTA, ITMA, IBA, AIPLA, CIB of ICC and the INTA AntiCounterfeiting & Enforcement Committee for 2004 – 2005.” INTA, Panel of Neutrals, Bio of
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On the other hand, the multilateral register for wines and spirits
appears much more suitable to serve the purpose of facilitating the
protection of GIs for wines and spirits because it is expected to increase
uniformity in the international market. Thus, the number of lawsuits
are reduced. Indeed, once a GI for wines and spirits has been
successfully registered (that means that no challenges have been
lodged), it will basically receive the same treatment in all the WTO
Member states. An administrative officer or judge will have to consult
the register and find out if, in some other part of the world, there is any
previous right holder. However, no empirical studies or data are
available at the moment on this issue and thus the inferences reported
here cannot be considered conclusive unless supported by further
investigations. These investigations might include, for example, the
analysis of the European cases in which the system of registration is
much more developed than in many other countries.
It also seems useful to report the results of a study conducted by the
128
United Nations University, Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS)
129
on the role of register and database in the protection of TK, which
does not provide a conclusive answer about the effectiveness of these
systems but underlines that both these measures “alone do not provide
a means for the effective protection of TK. Rather they must be seen as
130
one element or mechanism in a wider system of TK governance . . . .”
More significant for the purpose of the Article appears to be the
additional conclusion of this study. It reports that depending on their
specific objectives, databases and registers may play a substantial role in
Pravin Anand, Anand and Anand, http://www.inta.org/downloads/adr_AnandPravin.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2008).
128. “UNU-IAS was established in 1996 as a research and training center . . . to
undertake research and post postgraduate education on emerging issues of strategic
importance for the United Nations and in its Member States.” UNU-IAS Report, supra note
115, at 5.
129. Id. The UNU-IAS’ project consists of a comparative study of cases in which
either a database or a register has been adopted to protect TK and has been conduced with “a
view to identifying their effectiveness, possibilities and limitations.” Id. The goal was to
produce a “more informed and productive debate in the international negotiations about the
protection of [TK].”
Seven case studies have been considered and divided in four categories: [1-] indigenous
registers and databases: database of Inuit of Nunavik in Canada [; 2-] institutional databases
BioZulua database in Venezuela and the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library [TKDL] in
India [;3-] NGO co-operative databases: database of Farmer’s Rights Information System
(FRIS) and database of Honey Bee Network database, both in India [; 4-] state registers:
holistic register in Panama and national and local registers of TK relating to biodiversity of
Peru. Id. at 8.
130. Id.
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achieving TK governance. In particular, in the case of protection of TK,
there can be two different approaches:
•

•

Defensive protection: consists in preventing the
granting of patent over TK through the incorporation
of TK into a database for the purpose of aiding patent
authorities in search of prior art. This approach
facilitates “access to TK for the private sector,
without increasing indigenous . . . peoples’ rights in
131
any way over their knowledge.”
Positive protection: consists in the legal recognition in
favor of indigenous people of rights over TK. One
way to provide this kind of protection is the adoption
132
of a register specific for this purpose.

In other words, “[d]atabases can play an important role in defensive
133
protection of TK” whereas registers are more suitable for positive
protection of TK. Additionally, any decision about the adoption of one
of these systems should be made with this consideration in mind. It is
therefore possible to conclude that the results of this study are
applicable to the case of GIs. Given what was established by Article 23
134
of the TRIPs Agreement for wines and spirits,
the adoption of a
register should be preferred over the introduction of a database as a
positive system of protection of GIs in which rights are recognized to
GIs holders is established by the TRIPs Agreement.
Nevertheless, as reported above, these considerations are not
sufficient to reach a conclusive determination about the effectiveness of
registers and databases to facilitate the international protection of GIs.
Therefore, particularly considering the significant difficulties
encountered by the WTO negotiators on this subject, they call for
131. And thus produce the positive effect of enriching the public domain on which new
inventions can be developed. It is worth emphasizing that the scope of the reported study is
not to determine whether indigenous people are entitled to rights on their TK, but only to
test the effectiveness of certain measures to achieve different goals. Id. at 6.
132. Of course, in this case, the register alone would not suffice and would have to be
part of wider system of protection of TK. The same is true if instead a “defensive protection”
approach were adopted, as the creation of a database per se most probably would not be
enough to protect TK, but will require also the establishment of some kind of more general
system in which this informational tool produces the most efficient results. Id. at 7-8.
133. Id. at 38.
134. Particularly Article 23(2) of the TRIPs Agreement, which provides that the
rejection and invalidation of TM for wines which contains or consists of GIs at the request of
an interested party (i.e. a GI owner). TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(2).
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further and deeper analysis that unfortunately goes far beyond the
scope of this paper.
III. THE EXTENSION OF ARTICLE 23 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT TO
GIS ON PRODUCTS OTHER THAN WINES AND SPIRITS
The extension of the higher level of protection of Article 23 of the
TRIPs Agreement to products other than wines and spirits has been a
very controversial issue in the international negotiations for the
protection of GIs. It is therefore important to clarify that presently
there is no clear understanding among the WTO member states as to
135
whether a mandate exists under Doha to negotiate this subject. If one
assumes that the delegates do indeed have sufficient authority to
negotiate the extension of Article 23, we once again find the member
states divided between the two main lines of arguments, split with the
EU on one side and the United States on the other.
Those advocating the extension of a higher level of protection see it
as a means to better market their products. Those opposing the
extension argue, instead, that the existing (Article 22 of the TRIPs
Agreement) level of protection for these products is adequate, and that
136
providing enhanced protection would be too expensive.
Also, an
increasing number of developing countries, among them Latvia,
Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, India, Pakistan, Mauritius, Kenya, Sri
Lanka, Egypt, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Indonesia and
Nicaragua, have shown significant interest in the extension of Article 23

135. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 35. In particular, the relevant
portion of the Doha declaration says: “[w]e note that issues related the extension of the
protection of geographical indications provided for in art. 23 to products other than wines and
spirits will be addressed in the Council for TRIPs pursuant to §12 of this declaration.” Id. §
18. Problems arose in regard to this mandate because some states questioned if indeed the
aforementioned §12 could provide the required authority to undertake this specific
negotiations More information on this point are available at http://www.wto.org/english/trat
op_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm#protection.
136. Once again no empirical evidences can be reported on this point. As on
commentator noted:
there is very little analysis available on the costs and benefits of geographical
indications. There is ample anecdotal evidence in Europe that land for the
protection of geographically protected wines sells for several times the cost of
similar land in the same area but outside the GI territory. There are statistics that
show that the turnover in products sold using geographical indications exceeds [$10
billion] in the EC, but there is no breakdown of these figures as between products,
traders and distributors. Significant research is required before true cost and benefit
analysis can be made.
O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 404.
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to other products of their interest such as coffee, cotton, and rice among
others in the recent past. The reason for such attention can be traced
137
both to the agricultural policy of these countries and to the problem of
138
protection of traditional knowledge, which is a very sensitive issue for
a substantial portion of the developing world.
Given these considerations, it is clear that one should be more
cautious when approaching the issue of the extension of Article 23 than
the issue of the multilateral register. This is because in this case, an
increase in the level of protection for certain products could possibly
lead to a reduction in the level of competition in the relevant global
139
market and a reduction of consumer choice.
In the context of the
multilateral register, instead, the only thing discussed is the method of
implementation of a given level of protection that already exists in the
world market and for which the WTO member states have already
pondered and accepted the related costs and benefits when they entered
the TRIPs Agreement. Therefore, as explained below, any
determination about the extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs
Agreement should be undertaken only after a thorough investigation of
the rationale underlying it. One must also consider the related trade
issues in order to develop a better informed policy choice, one that will
serve the interests of the entire international community, and not just a
few of its members.
A. Why Are GIs Needed in the First Place?
In order to understand whether Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement
should be extended to GIs of products other than wines and spirits, it is
first necessary to define the need served by this particular form of
identifier, or, in other words, the purpose for its existence. Part I
provided a brief description of the historical reasons for the creation of
GIs, while Part II discussed how the international regime is the result of
a difficult political compromise. However, in order to advocate a
further extension of this regime to new kinds of products, it is necessary
to conduct a deeper investigation that goes beyond the economic
interests of the involved parties and leads to a solution that could
generally be accepted. To accomplish this goal, it is therefore necessary
to understand the mixture of protectionism and intent to reduce
consumers’ excessive research costs that characterizes GIs.
137. See infra Part III.B.2.
138. See infra Part III.B.3.
139. For a discussion of consequent significant trade distortion, see infra Part III.A.
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GIs have always been treated as a form of IP akin to trademarks,
and for this reason the same philosophical rationale underlying
trademarks has often been adopted to justify the protection of these
geographic terms. In particular, supporters of GI protection have often
underlined the need to provide consumers with accurate information
140
about the origin of products in order to avoid trade distortion. Also, it
has been noted that in the modern market, in which consumers have
become increasingly demanding, being able to build consumer
confidence through accurate information about the origin of the
141
products is economically valuable.
Conversely, those against the protection of GIs reject the argument
that this “trade distortion” is caused by insufficient or inaccurate
information. Rather, they consider GIs to be a form of protectionism
that works to the exclusive advantage of a few producers in a particular
region. Therefore, they also envision a trade distortion problem, but
they believe this problem is caused by the reduction of the level of
competition in the international market, that, in absence of GI
142
protection, would have been produced by new entrants.
Ultimately,
they argue, a reduction of consumer welfare would result.
In order to evaluate these opposing arguments, it is first important
to determine whether indeed there is a trade distortion connected to
insufficient or inaccurate information being provided to consumers
regarding the geographic origin of certain products. For this purpose it
is possible to underline that when a correlation between the geographic
place in which the product is produced and its quality is present, the
143
information conveyed by GIs is valuable to the consumers. This
information helps consumers make better-informed decisions and
144
Ultimately,
consequently reduces the possibility of market failures.
such a system of information would favor the development of a higher
level of consumer confidence. It is thus possible to conclude that, if

140. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87 (where the EU representative’s
argument about the trade distortion caused by the absence of adequate protection of GIs in
the international market, which was presented during negotiations that preceded the TRIPs
Agreement).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 170-71.
142. Tim Josling, Geographical Indications: Protection for Producers or Consumers
Information? (unpublished article, (on file with the author).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 170-71.
144. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 591 (5th
ed. 2000) (“Competitive markets fail for four basic reasons: market power, incomplete
information, externalities, and public goods.”).
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there is this connection, the absence of protection of GIs creates trade
distortion in the international market.
The problem, however, is to determine how much information is
145
necessary to increase consumer welfare in the way described above
without incurring too many related costs. In the case of GI protection,
this would consist mainly of reduced competition in the relevant
146
In other words, it is important to provide just enough
market.
information to create consumer welfare without having to sacrifice too
much competition. This also benefits consumers. Indeed, when the
costs of providing the information outweighs the benefit that the
consumer can get from it, the consumer suffers because the amount of
information received does not compensate for the reduction of
competition in the market. In this situation, there is overprotection of
147
GIs, as the only subjects who benefit from it are the local producers.
This results in a trade distortion. Instead, when the costs of providing
the information do not outweigh the benefit provided to the consumer,
and the consumer is willing to pay for that information, GIs are under148
149
protected; thus, there is a market failure.
The “benefit in this case
goes to the producer of the product that would not have been purchased
150
with consequent trade
if adequate information were provided”
distortion.
Applying this analysis to the international protection of GIs under
the TRIPs Agreement evidences the challenge of determining the right
level of information and the right level of protection required for
producing optimal consumer welfare. This is because consumers around
the world have different needs for information about different products.
However, this determination is at the same time essential for the
development of international trade, as uniform standards help to reduce

145. Josling, supra note 142.
146. Indeed, another significant cost is represented by the fact that those consumers
that consider certain geographic names as generic terms might be misled by an increase of
protection that would include such terms. An example could be represented by the use of the
term “champagne,” which for some consumers represents a certain kind of sparkling wine
and not a particular wine coming from a specific geographic region of France. Indeed, as
discussed below, see infra Part IV, the level of protection of Article 23 of the TRIPs
Agreement should not extend to generic terms. See also on this point the discussion of the
Australian delegate during the negotiations that preceded the TRIPs agreement. See supra
text accompanying notes 72-75.
147. Josling, supra note 142.
148. Id.
149. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 144, at 592.
150. Id.
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transaction costs and uncertainty in the global market. In these regards,
it can thus be noted that a level of protection that goes beyond the
“misleading test” of Article 22 of the TRIPs Agreement, such as the one
that is provided by Article 23, is difficult to justify under the analysis
151
above.
This conclusion can also be explained through the concept of
consumer utility or well-being, which may be defined as a function of a
combination of a certain amount of information and a certain amount of
competition within this context. After a certain point, the utility of
obtaining additional information at the expense of competition
decreases, as does consumer satisfaction. In other words, there is a
point after which consumers do not know what to do with more
information—as they already know everything they need in order to
make their purchases—but they do not mind more competition—and
thus having more choices. The same reasoning applies if instead there is
too much competition and not enough information. In this case,
152
While the
consumers lose confidence and thus are less satisfied.
enactment of Article 22 certainly reduces competition, it also increases
the information available to the point of allowing consumers to make
the purchases they want, which results in a higher level of utility.
However, additional information beyond Article 22 is not essential for
customers’ decisions and, at the same time, causes a decrease in
competition; therefore, the utility decreases.
It is therefore possible to say that if the level of information
provided beyond Article 22 is not economically justifiable, a different
rationale for the extension of Article 23 to products other than wine and
spirits might be required. Indeed, as has been suggested by Josling, “in
a world where trade in different products is expanding and producer
incomes from satisfying consumer desire for quality and variety are
replacing subsidies from government assisting the market in meeting
153
such demand is both wise and economically defensive.”
If this is true in the case of GIs, then it suggests that even though
consumer welfare is not increased by additional information about the
origin of the products beyond a certain level, it is increased by the
151. More precisely, it is difficult to understand how, at that point, consumer
satisfaction is enhanced by adding additional units of information that are not needed to
avoid market failure. See infra Figure 1.
152. Id.
153. Josling, supra note 142. Indeed, significant in these regards are the international
negotiations on the agriculture that are characterized by a progressive elimination of trade
barriers such as tariffs and quotas.
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ability of these identifiers to satisfy the consumers’ demand for a certain
quality and variety. This, in turn, suggests that consumer demand is
indeed the focal point. The quality of the product, which is not intended
as a particular standard, but as a distinctive character of the product,
becomes the most important element and measure for the protection of
GIs. If this perspective is indeed adopted, the extension of Article 23 is
then warranted only when the connection between the quality of the
154
product and its place of origin is irreplaceable elsewhere, such as in
155
the case of wine. The additional rent that producers derive from such
an extension is then used as an incentive to keep producers close to the
156
territory and investing in the maintenance of the desired quality.
This conclusion, linking protection of GIs to further investments in
the quality of products, seems to be reinforced by what has happened to
the wine industry in the last decade. During this period wine producers
have shifted their focus towards quality. In the 1990s, consumers’ and
producers’ interest focused on “premium” wines as revealed by the
increase in consumption of high-priced wines and the production of
157
high-priced grapes.
During the same time, wine exports of those
158
wine producers
countries that are not considered traditional
(Argentina, Australia, Chile, South Africa and United States) have
159
expanded significantly and are still expanding.
Therefore, it is
possible to say that today the wine industry is much more competitive
than in the past and that apparently the introduction of Article 23 of the
TRIPs Agreement did not present an obstacle for such a development
154. In absence of this exclusive connection, other means of protection for the quality
of the products could be envisioned, such as in the case of certificate mark—certificate marks
only say that products have a certain quality, not that this quality is due to its place of origin
which is instead what GIs do.
155. As explained below in Part III.C, this is because of the application of the concept
of terroir that identifies the elements that make wine unique. See infra Part III.C.
156. In this regard, the remarks made by the EU delegate during the negotiations
become significant. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
157. In the United States, for instance, the consumption of wines above $7 passed from
9.5 million cases in 1991 to 41.2 million in 2001, whereas the consumption of wines below $7
passed from 97.3 million to 103.9 million. The increment of the high-priced wine was 673%
versus the 6% of the “jug” wine. Dale Heiein & Philip Martin, California Wine Industry
Enters New Era, CAL. AGRIC., July-Sep. 2003, at 72, available at http://californiaagriculture.
ucop.edu/0303JAS/pdfs/wine.pdf.
158. The countries that are considered the traditional wine producers are Italy, France
and Spain because of their history with the product, and because in the last fifty years they
have had a share of the entire world market between fifty and sixty percent. Id. at 74.
159. For example the average yearly increase rate of wine exports from the countries
listed above is twelve percent. 2004 Crop: Quality Excellent, Yields Down, THE CRUSH, Oct.
2004, Volume 31, Issue 10; Heiein & Martin, supra note 157, at 74.
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in this market.
This is because the fundamental element that has
characterized the market for wine is the demand for quality and not the
amount of information available to consumers in that market. This
conclusion can be explained once again with the consumer utility that, in
this context, can be understood as a combination of a certain amount of
161
quality and a certain amount of competition.
Finally, it is possible to infer that an extension of Article 23 to
products other than wine and spirits could cause the same result, or, in
other words, could create a much more competitive market in quality
goods. As explained below, the validity of this extension would become
at this point an empirical issue that must be verified case-by-case for
each category of products. This verification depends on the products’
intrinsic characteristics and their relationship with the territory in which
162
they are produced.
B. The Debate about the Extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement
There is a substantial academic debate on the extension of Article 23
to GIs on products other than wines and spirits. Presented below are
the most significant arguments that have been used to support the
various viewpoints of the debate.
1. GIs as Generic Terms
The most recurrent argument used to explain the reluctance of the
United States and other countries to extend the level of protection of
Article 23 and their opposition to the EU’s initiative to regain the
exclusive use of certain GIs names is related to the characterization of
163
terms. Many terms that qualify as GIs in the EU and other countries
are considered generic names in the United States, or, in other words,
164
common descriptive names for certain types of goods.
160. The exact impact of the introduction of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement on the
development of the wine market in the last decade is difficult to assess. Indeed, the only
possible observation on this point consists in the fact that notwithstanding the adoption of
Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement, the wine market developed in the way described in the
text and that therefore the introduction of the higher level of protection for GIs on wine and
spirits seems not to have had a negative impact on the market or seems to have been
counterbalanced by some other factor such as the strong consumer demand for higher quality
and variety. See Heiein & Martin, supra note 157.
161. See infra Figure 2.
162. Does the product, whose GI protection is considered, have those qualities that can
be derived exclusively from its place of origin as indicated by the GI itself?
163. See infra Part IV.
164. As described above, the “sort” of generic terms in relation to the international
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In particular, one commentator noted that: “American consumers
are blissfully ignorant of the way in which [Appellation of Controlled
Origin] (AOCs) and other [GIs] express complex linkages between the
territorial origin of food products and the human contribution to their
165
refinement.”
In other words, American consumers do not perceive
that GIs indicate that the product comes from a particular region of the
world and that its qualities are due, among other things, to this factor.
Also, according to this author, there is no evidence that American
consumers value this information when making a purchase choice. He
also underlines the fact that generic or semi-generic terms coupled with
a term designating their actual origin are common and perfectly
acceptable locutions in the American language.
This argument does not seem to be as accurate as the
aforementioned commentator states, in part due to the awareness of the
average American consumer. Indeed, it is true that many consumers in
the United States are unaware of the full significance of GIs,
particularly on products coming from a different country, but this
conclusion certainly cannot be generalized. A more specific explanation
on this point is required.
As noted by another commentator, “[t]he point in determining
whether the—’generic’—argument is applicable depends on the relevant
166
market with which we are dealing.” In other words, we cannot judge
the behavior of American consumers without defining a priori which
“segment” of consumers is interested in the product in consideration.
Indeed, if this analysis is based on the relevant market for the specific
product, the behavior and knowledge of the American consumer is not
much different from the behavior and knowledge of the European
167
For a mere issue of proximity, European consumers are more
one.
familiar with European GIs and their significance, but a substantial
portion of Europeans (as part of the local relevant market) have also
begun to recognize American and Australian wines, among other

protection of GIs is indeed not a new issue and it has been a source of conflict among the
delegates since the very beginning of the negotiations for the TRIPs Agreement. See supra
text accompanying notes 72-79.
165. Jim Chen, A Sober Second Look at Appellation of Origin: How the United States
will Crash France’s Wine and Cheese Party, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 29, 60 (1996).
166. Philippe Zylberg, Geographical Indications v. Trademarks:
The Lisbon
Agreement: A Violation of TRIPs?, 11 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 62 (2003).
167. Id. at 61. In both cases the issue of whether a specific term is a generic one or not,
becomes an empirical question to be verified in each of the relevant markets involved by the
GI in consideration and not in the market at large.
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products, and to identify them by their origin and quality. The same can
be said for the relevant segment of American consumers in relation to
168
other domestic and foreign products.
Also, it should be kept in mind that because GIs are normally
169
related to very high quality products and not to mass-distribution
products, we should define the relevant market based on this
information. Also, it should be considered that, particularly in the
“western developed world,” the standard of living and the level of
education have significantly risen in the last decade, and thus, an
increasing number of consumers make more sophisticated purchasing
170
decisions.
Moreover, today’s consumers, “[f]aced with the on-going
transformation in the agri-food industry weakening the products’ land171
based association and with problems such as the ‘mad cow’ disease,”
have found new purchasing criteria and have become more demanding.
Consumers are guided more and more often in their purchase decisions
by health and environmental concerns. Indeed, there is a growing
consumer interest in “environmentally sound and socially responsible
172
quality products” and thus an increased awareness of their origin and
quality. In this context, GIs are becoming extremely powerful and
valuable marketing tools, and consumers from all over the world are
becoming aware of their significance.
In conclusion, in today’s world GIs add value to products because
173
they meet the demand of an increasing number of consumers by
identifying products of high quality whose valuable characteristics are
due to their origin. Thus, they deserve to be protected against the risk,

168. Id.
169. Nothing in the TRIPs Agreement limits the use of GIs to high-quality products.
However, given the way in which GIs developed in the EU, it can be said that historically
they have been normally associated with products possessing some special qualities that were
believed to derive from their place of origin. As explained above, in order to preserve this
goodwill, and given the collective ownership of GIs (in those countries that have a sui generis
GIs law), producers in many countries have created associations that have the function of
fixing standards of quality and monitoring their observance by all the producers who wish to
use the area where they are located. Id. at 25.
170. Zylberg, supra note 166, at 17.
171. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 874.
172. Id.
173. However, it should be noted that some other consumers could be confused by the
protection of GIs, particularly when the terms in consideration have become generic in
certain countries. Indeed, as explained below in Part IV, the protection of GIs should not
include generic terms.
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174

on one side, of becoming generic names and, on the other, of being
“captured” by free-riders. As noted by a commentator, “the only issue
175
is determining which names should be protected and how to deal with
the problem of the abuse of those names by those who are not
176
entitled.”
2. Consumer Protection and Agricultural Policy
Another significant argument presented against the extension of the
higher level of protection provided by Article 23 of the TRIPs
Agreement to products other than wines and spirits and the EU’s
initiative to regain the exclusive use of certain GIs is that GIs are
“designed primarily to maximize producer incomes and only
177
secondarily, if at all, to protect consumer expectations.” Moreover, it
has also been noted that by extending the scope of Article 23, a number
of products will have to be relabeled, and thus, there is a substantial risk
of increasing consumer confusion.
Therefore, according to one
commentator, it is not quite clear if consumers will materially benefit
178
from an extension of protection of Article 23 to all goods. He has also
underscored that, in the end:
[i]f a product label uses a geographical term in its name that is
not the true origin of the product, while clearly and
simultaneously informing the consumer of the product’s true
origin elsewhere on the label, [the] so-informed consumer[] can
reject the product as not ‘authentic.’ Ultimately, consumer
purchasing power may provide the impetus to producers to cease
179
using the geographical term in the product’s name.
In response to these comments, one author has noted that GIs “seek
180
to guarantee the accuracy of information to the consumer.”
He

174. For those terms that are already generic, see infra Part IV.
175. Both in relation to the requirements for being a GI and to the determination to
those GIs that at this point indeed acquired the status of generic name; see infra Part IV for a
brief discussion about generic terms and pre-existing cases.
176. O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 56. Indeed, it should be pointed out that “the issue
is not so clear on the practical side. There are a number of practical examples of conflicts
which underline the debate on GIs.” Id. One of the most famous examples is the use of the
word “Budweiser” and “Budvar” for beer.
177. Chen, supra note 165, at 62.
178. Bowers, supra note 63, at 155.
179. Id. at 158.
180. Zylberg, supra note 166, at 61.
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explains that, “the segmentation of the market [resulting from an
increased protection] should not be considered a monopoly but a way of
ensuring product conformity to a list of product requirements that
181
Moreover, according to this commentator,
consumers expect.”
protecting GIs “fosters at least a higher level of consumer protection
182
against deception than any other intellectual property right (such as,
183
for example, trademarks).”
Therefore, the primary goal of GIs is to
protect consumers from confusion, and not to expose them to such a
risk as other commentators suggest.
Other commentators have also noted that, with the extension of
Article 23, “products illegitimately using [GIs] may well be relabel[]ed,
but this [will] only [happen] . . . where the same product category is
concerned and where these products do not qualify for one of the
184
According to them, “[i]t
exceptions provided for in Article 24.”
seems, . . . to be a rather daring argument to maintain that consumers
185
might be confused by correct label[]ing and use of GIs.”
Yet, commentators who oppose the extension of Article 23 are not
convinced of the benefits that consumers will gain from the extension.
These commentators argue that the GI system proposed by the EU is a
measure of agricultural policy and not a law aimed at consumer
protection. In particular, according to one author, GIs “lie at the heart
of an elaborate scheme to secure exclusive production rights and a
186
desirable return on incumbent farmers’ entrepreneurship.”
The issue of agricultural policy is closely related to the controversy
187
regarding the GIs, and therefore, it is worth spending a few words to
explain the underlying problem. Is the regulation of GIs a measure of
agricultural policy? It certainly is! As noted by one commentator, a
legitimate system of registered GIs . . . requires proof and preservation
of a real connection with a geographic area, and arguably also
observance of product standards . . . . [A] system that imposes [such]
181. Id.
182. In these regards, it is important to keep in mind that GIs, intended as identifiers
that increase consumers’ welfare by providing useful information, can perform this function
only when the consumers in the relevant market do not already associate them with some
other meaning other than the geographic place from where the product originated.
183. Id.
184. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 890. See also infra Part IV (briefly discussing
the issue of generic terms and pre-existing cases). Of particular significance in this regard is
the exception known as the grandfather clause. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(4).
185. Id.
186. Chen, supra note 167, at 62. See also supra Part III.A; note 154.
187. Id. at 62-64.
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strict controls on agricultural production is quite clearly an instrument
188
of agricultural policy.”
The next question is therefore automatic: who will benefit from this
regulation? The answer depends on the industrial and agricultural
context. “As a general rule, the potential economic benefits of
registered GIs are most apparent where established industries in rural
areas adhere to traditional methods and established crop choices, have
189
maintained geographic integrity and have an established reputation.”
It is therefore clear that the EU and the developing countries
supporting the extension of the protection of GIs are those that, for
historical and economic reasons, will benefit the most from this
regulation. The increased level of protection will also yield other
benefits for them such as rural goodwill, maintenance of rural
employment, the creation of added value for foodstuffs, and limiting of
190
overproduction.
Nevertheless, it is fair to underscore that, although to a certain
extent the aforementioned effects of a system of protection of GIs are
well-accepted policy goals, the extension of the scope of protection of
Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement might not necessarily be the best
way to achieve them in every country. Indeed, in countries in which
general policy settings reflect that the structure of rural industry
fluctuates over time, crop choice decisions are unsettled, and innovation
and flexibility are established tools of rural policy, “[i]t will be more
effective to rely on corporate branding strategies, as well as combating
consumer deception as to origin by way of actions against
misrepresentation, and/or reliance on collective or certifications
191
marks.”
3. Developing Countries and the Issue of Traditional Knowledge.
The existing relationship between the international regulation of GIs
and the agricultural policy of different countries illustrates why in the
last couple of years a number of developing countries, such as India,

188. W. Van Caenegem, Registered GIs: Intellectual Property, Agricultural Policy and
International Trade, 26(4) E.I.P.R. 170, 175 (2004).
189. Id.
190. The limitation of overproduction to a certain extent might be inconsistent with
some of the GATT principles supporting agriculture. A full discussion of this point goes
beyond the scope of this paper, however, it is worth mentioning that some commentators
have noticed how GIs are becoming a “substitute” for those measures of agriculture policy
that are not permissible an more. Josling, supra note 143.
191. Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 176.
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Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Pakistan, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Egypt,
Mexico, Perù and Cuba have demonstrated significant interest in this
192
kind of intellectual property. Several commentators have pointed out
that because of the intrinsic characteristics of GIs and the specific
agricultural policy of some developing countries based on small-scale
and traditional methods of rural production, an extension of the scope
of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement will benefit the economies of
those countries by providing competitive advantages to their products
193
Today, many developing countries are
on the international market.
demanding higher protection for GIs without distinction between wines
and spirits and other products for this reason. Indeed, as one
commentator has pointed out with specific reference to African
countries, “[b]y fostering traditional products and names . . . , by adding
value to food production, and by giving international name recognition
to a community, [GIs] can play a minor but nevertheless important role
194
in bolstering the rural areas where the majority of people live.”
However, the enhanced international protection of GIs does not
come for free. As several commentators have noted, it will require the
establishment, at least at the state level, of an expensive system of
195
policing that enhances protection to all products and of qualitycontrol in order to guarantee the consistent quality that is the most
important element of the entire system. Many developing countries will
have to invest a significant amount of resources to meet the
requirements of the GI system of registration and protection, and for
some of them the costs might ultimately be unbearable. Moreover, the
benefits of GI protection will not be immediate and will require a longterm investment because the traditional products of these countries will
have to first build their reputation on the international market before
becoming truly competitive and thus producing the desired results. In
other words, the enhanced protection of GIs will require developing
countries to undertake a significant financial effort for a benefit, which,
although substantial and potentially achievable, will arrive sometime in
the distant future.
On the other hand, what choice do they have? As one commentator
notes, “[a] number of developing countries have, in their

192. Marsha A. Echols, Geographical Indications for Food, TRIPs and the Doha
Development Agenda, 47 J. AFR. L., 199, 211-12 (2003).
193. See id.
194. Id. at 200.
195. Van Caenegem, supra note 188.
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communication to the TRIPs Council, identified [GIs] as a category of
intellectual property right from which they might profit. This is
probably more than can be said for the other categories of intellectual
196
As for the
property rights, which they are obliged to implement.”
costs, the author very cynically underscores that “[i]t is arguable how
much of a greater burden this would impose in addition to the European
wine and spirits indications, which developing countries are already
197
obliged to protect under Article 23.1.”
Moreover,
the necessity for developing countries to implement the
multifarious obligations in the TRIPs Agreement . . . involved
very considerable burdens. These major implementation costs
were imposed upon developing countries without any suggestion
of the necessity to undertake financial or economic impact
studies. Against this, the costs of extending Article 23.1 are
198
arguably negligible.
In conclusion, it can be said that the request of developing countries
should be given substantial weight in the consideration of expanding the
protection of GIs as this represents for them one of few serious
opportunities for economic development. Nevertheless, developed
countries, and the EU in particular, should not use this factor as an alibi
to achieve their own goals. They should provide the required assistance
and guidance to those countries that decide to invest in the development
of their own GIs.
Developing countries have also put forth the initiative of using GIs
to protect traditional knowledge (TK). While a full discussion of this
199
issue goes far beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth some
explanation. There is currently no universally accepted definition of
TK. “Most international organizations and scholars define TK, in fairly
broad terms, as a diverse range of tradition-based innovations and

196. Blakeney, supra note 1, at 650.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 645-50.
199. This represents a very synthetic analysis of the issue of the protection of TK. As
explained in the text, some commentators have suggested protecting TK through GIs;
however, it has to be understood that this would be only a partial solution for TK owners as
they also ask for a more patent like protection. Unfortunately, a full discussion of this point
goes far beyond the scope of this paper.
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creations resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific,
200
literary, or artistic fields.”
Although TK is recognized as a culturally and economically
important area of intellectual activity, it does not receive the benefit of
intellectual property protection.
Problems arise . . . because TK . . . is not the kind of intellectual
activity that western IP law anticipates protecting. [The result is]
that developing countries and [non-governmental organizations
(NGOs)] observe . . . the ‘taking’ of genetic resources and
biodiversity, developed by TK in local communities, [to be used]
in support of research and development (R&D) efforts for
industries in the developed world. [The d]eveloped countries
and their constituents think of such activit[y] as legitimate R&D,
while developing countries and supporting NGOs call these
201
instances of “biopiracy.”
Currently the TRIPs system does not explicitly protect TK, and thus,
TK holders, in order to assert their rights, have to operate in each and
every country on a case-by-case basis. This situation represents an
obvious disadvantage particularly for those people who come from a
developing country and thus have limited resources. As noted by some
commentators, a solution to this problem could be represented by the
international protection of TK through the extension of the scope of
Article 23. “TK emerges from the customs, practices and needs of a
particular people or territory, . . . [and has] as much direct connection
as, if not more than, wines and spirits to the region in which they
202
GIs also, because of the lack of private ownership that
originate.”
characterize them, represent a particularly suitable form of IP
protection for TK that has as one of its most notable factors, the
communal sense of origin. According to this author, the costs of
extending the scope of Article 23 are offset by the benefit represented
by the preservation of TK. “TK and its products . . . have economic
value to the local communit[y] in which they develop,” and GIs make
203
sure that such value stays where originated.

200.
Strategies
(2004).
201.
202.
203.

Sumathi Subbiah, Reaping What They Sow: The Basmati Rice Controversy and
for Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 529, 531
Id. at 530.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 559.

2008]

REGULATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATION

247

4. Preservation of Culture
Another argument presented in support of extending the scope of
Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement is the cultural one. As noted by one
commentator, “[b]y inserting a section for the protection of [GIs] in
TRIPs, traditionally made foods were saved, or rather, the threat of the
McDonaldization of those traditionally and culturally impregnated
204
goods were weakened.” Therefore, according to this argument, a high
205
level of protection of GIs would promote diversity and, by conveying
the cultural identity of a nation, region, or locality, would add a human
206
dimension to the goods. The export of such goods would then enable
countries to better understand the culture of other countries.
However, it is important to underscore that, although the
aforementioned effects are certainly desirable, it is very difficult to
directly trace these effects to a high level of protection of GIs, and
therefore, more evidence establishing this link should be provided in
order to come to these conclusions.
5. Costs of GI System
One commentator has pointed out that
[t]here is little doubt that the setting up of a domestic register of
GIs is an expensive undertaking . . . . [For instance], a legitimate
GI registration system should ensure consistent product
standards and a close geographical connection. This requires a
complex determination of specifications and enforcement.
[Therefore, t]he advantage, if any, gained by having a system of
registered GIs is countered by the financial cost of the system,
207
borne by agricultural producers but also by taxpayers at large.
In response to this consideration, some other commentators have
noted that
[e]xtending the scope of protection for products other than wines
and spirits does not entitle the setting up of any new mechanism
or scheme of protection . . . . In fact, the existing scope of
protection for GIs for wines and spirits required by the TRIPs
204.
205.
206.
207.

Zylberg, supra note 166, at 61.
Id.
Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 874.
Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 176.
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Agreement already today would be simply extended to GIs for
other products. Therefore, the same protection system or
mechanism chosen by a Member in order to implement Article
23 could also be used to grant the extended product coverage
208
protection.
Also, with regard to the financial side of a GI system, it has been
noted that “[l]ike other forms of intellectual property, registered GIs do
not constitute their own reward. Investment is required to build their
reputation, by way of protection, promotion and advertising . . . .
209
Building goodwill is obviously expensive but also takes time.”
Nevertheless, this point does not seem to be very convincing because, if
the alternative to the use of GIs for producers is to seek protection
through the trademark system, or some other form of certification mark,
then the same kind of investment in time and financial resources would
be required for this latter option, making the argument self210
eliminating.
6. Imbalance Between Countries with Regard to Existing GIs
A number of WTO countries have a long tradition in GI protection
and have, therefore, developed many more GIs over time than those
present in other countries, which have just started to make use of and
benefit from this kind of intellectual property. For this reason,
countries opposing the extension of protection of GIs argue that the
countries with current GI systems will enjoy a much higher benefit in
the short run from such an extension than those countries that are only
211
recently starting to develop GIs.
In response to this point, some
commentators have noted that, “it is important to recognize that it is not
the number of GIs per country that should be taken into consideration
when assessing the merit of a better GI protection, but rather the
212
economic potential of each well-protected GI.”
Although it can certainly be said that these authors have a point, the
213
former argument does not seem to be satisfactory, as some countries

208. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 887.
209. Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 176. See also supra Part II.B.3.
210. Indeed, the same author also seems to admit this point when he says “like other
forms of intellectual property . . . .” Van Caenegem, supra note 189, at 176.
211. See Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 887.
212. Id. at 889.
213. Particularly the developing countries. See supra Part III.B.3.
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might not yet be in a position to be competitive in a market with a few
strong GIs.
C. Practical Perspective About the Extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs
Agreement
As discussed above, the most important element to determine the
legitimacy of extending Article 23 to GIs on products other than wines
and spirits is the connection between the quality and uniqueness of the
product and its place of origin. This connection must be exclusive to the
point that the desired quality of the product in consideration must be
impossible to replicate in any other place. The described relationship is
present in the case of wine, but it seems reasonable to infer that this
characteristic is not limited to wine. Additionally, there might be many
other products that present similar or even stronger connections with
their place of origin. If this is true, disparity of treatment problems
emerge among producers of wine and producers of similar products.
Indeed, as noted by some commentators, at the moment producers
of goods other than wines and spirits are in a much more onerous
214
position compared to the producers of products covered by Article 23.
This is because, for instance, if the producers want to receive the
protection of Article 22, they must prove the illegitimate use of the
particular GI. This process consists of a use that misleads the public or
215
On the other hand, the producers of
constitutes unfair competition.
wines and spirits with registered GIs will not have to provide such proof
and thus will enjoy a higher uniformity of treatment in every WTO
216
Indeed, the level of determination of the domestic courts is
country.
much higher in the case of the existence of the elements required for the
finding of illegitimate use than in the case of ownership of a GI for wine,
and thus, it is plausible to conclude that different courts in different
countries (or even within the same country) can more easily reach
different decisions for similar situations in the case of Article 22 than in
the case of Article 23. Therefore, an extended system of protection for
GIs that would include all eligible products will have the benefit of
eliminating such a disparity of treatment among producers of similar
products.
In Part III.A, it has also been pointed out that the eligibility of the
products subject to the extension of Article 23 level of protection is an
214. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 882.
215. Id. at 881.
216. Id. at 882.

250 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

[12:2

empirical question that requires a case-by-case analysis of existence of
the specific “quality” of the product due to the territory in which it is
produced. To better illustrate this point, a brief description of the
empirical analysis that would be required for this purpose follows
below.
The first step consists of determining the relationship between the
qualities of wine and its place of origin. This is necessary because, as
discussed above, wine possesses the kind of “quality” required for the
level of protection provided by Article 23 under TRIPs. Thus, the
analysis of this product can facilitate the selection of the cases in which
this level of protection should be extended to other products. In other
words, it is necessary to determine in the first place what made wine so
special to determine the scope of Article 23.
The belief that the soil in a particular vineyard imparts a
distinctive character to the resulting wine is strong in Europe, but
less so in the New World. . . .
...
[Where it is believed that] [w]ith skilled wine-making techniques,
it should be possible to make quality wine from disease-free,
217
mature fruit of any desirable variety.
Nevertheless, studies have shown that “the distinctive character of
218
219
[the] wine will depend on the terroir (soil and climate)” and that
“[e]xamples exist of a significant influence of soil on wine character for
particular grape varieties grown in St.Emilion Pomerol, the Médoc, the
220
Côte d’Or, Beaujolais, Napa Valley, and the Coonawarra Region.”
Therefore, it appears essential to develop a better understanding of the

217. ROBERT E. WHITE, SOIL FOR FINE WINES 223, 249 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
218. Id.
The scientific and technical understanding of the influence of the soil in terroir is not as well
advanced as that of climate, grape variety, and cultural methods. . . . [S]oil is so variable in the
landscape . . . that quantitative relationship between soil properties and the yield and
composition of grapes will only be elucidated on a local scale (a few hectares in area). This is
consistent with the empirical evidence of the [French Apellation d’Origine Contrôllée] system
[(which identifies all the vineyards in particular areas, based on their geographic location,
and prescribes the acceptable varieties, viticultural methods, yield, fruit ripeness, and
maximum alcoholic strength of the wine)] especially as it applies to the Grand Crus of
Burgundy and the First Growths of Bordeaux.
Id. at 249.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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precise meaning and significance of the French term terroir for wine
production. The word terroir encompasses much more than the “simple
relationship between soil and wine as many other factors contribute to
221
define this concept.” Indeed, there exists a wide variety of alternative
meanings for the word terroir. This includes:
•
•

•

Metaphysical concept: in which “the vine make
222
known to us the true taste of the earth;”
Factual concept: in which “several factors . . . of the
natural environment (soil, climate, [and] topography),
biological (variety [and] rootstock), and human (of
223
wine, wine-making, and history)” are combined;
Dynamic concept: in which “permanent factors (e.g.,
geology, soil, [and] environment) and temporary
factors (variety, cultural methods [and] wine making
224
techniques)” are combined.

For the purpose of the present analysis, the “dynamic concept” of
terroir seems to be particularly useful as it illustrates which factors in the
production of wine strictly relate to the place of origin. This is opposed
to those other elements that, although very significant for the
determination of the special character of the end product, are transient
because of the human component that characterize them. Indeed, those
225
latter elements relate to people and not to geographic places, and
thus, are not relevant in terms of the protection provided by Article 23.
They can be easily transported by immigrants, and thus, do not possess
the territorial exclusivity element required by GIs.
The permanent factors, on the other hand, pertain uniquely to the
place of origin of the wine and they are not replicable elsewhere. They
are subject to changes, but to a much lower degree than the temporary

221. Id. at 3.
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. It is worth underscoring that it is possible to argue that “people” are also the
product of their environment and that, therefore, the kind of contribution provided by them
would not be possible unless they were part of the particular community where the wine is
produced. However, the kind of human contribution that is relevant in this context (and
consist mainly in “local culture” and “traditional methods”), although widely recognized, is
very difficult to be quantitatively determined and directly traced to the “quality” of wine, and
thus for the purpose of the present analysis it should be disregarded. See id at 249; Addor &
Grazioly, supra note 61, at 896.
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factors and over such a long period of time as to become almost
irrelevant in terms of wine production. Also, the changes themselves
pertain exclusively to the specific geographic place, and thus, they
become not replicable elsewhere.
It is necessary to analyze a specific example in which the relationship
between a particular terroir and the characteristics of the wine is
significant to determine how all of this applies in the context of real
products. For this purpose, the wine “Chianti Classico DOCG” (see
226
Table 1) has been selected.
It is possible to notice that in the
production of Chianti the particular terroir consist of both temporary
factors such as “growing and making techniques” and permanent factors
227
such as “soil, altitude, and climate.”
At this point it is necessary to compare the terroir of the Chianti with
the elements of production of another product (or category of products)
that has a strong relationship with the territory as well. For this
purpose, the Olio Extravergine d’Oliva ‘Riviera Ligure—Riviera dei
Fiori’ DOP (see Table 1) has been selected. It is possible to also notice
that temporary factors and permanent factors are involved in the
production process and that very similar dynamics to the one delineated
for the wine production can be envisioned in this context. Also, this
228
product has a very defined character that makes it unique, and that is
due, among other things, to elements such as the specific soil and
climate, which are exclusive to the place of origin and cannot be
replicated elsewhere.

226. In the case of Chianti Classico, the unique character is given by the particular
combination of elements such as “limpidity” (limpid), “color” (lively ruby-red tending to
garnet with aging), fragrance (vinous with scents of violets and a pronounced character of
finesse in the aging phase) and “flavor” (harmonious, dry—with a maximum of 4 grams of
reducing sugars per liter—sapid and lightly tannic). Chianti Classico, It’s the Land that Makes
the Difference, How it is Produced: Chianti Classico 2000, http://www.chianticlassico.com
[hereinafter ChiantiClassico].
227. See WHITE, supra note 217, at 3.
228. Consisting in the unique combination of elements such as color (golden, pale
straw-yellow), fragrance (pleasantly fruity) and taste (delicate, tending towards sweet). See
ChiantiClassico, supra note 226.
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Product Name

Wine
Chianti Classico DOCG

253

Olive Oil
Olio Extravergine
d’Oliva ‘Riviera
Ligure—Riviera dei
Fiori’ DOP

229

Permanent Factors
Location of
(Vineyards)Chianti Classico
230
plants
DOCG region —Italy
Terrain shape

Altitude
Soil

Climate

Slopes of hills (forbidden:
flat terrains) with
appropriate orientation
Above 700m.
Sandstone, limestone, marl,
clayey schist, sand and
pebbles.
Mediterranean/continental
climate: humid winter (4-5°
C), and dry, hot summers
(30° C)

Variety of the
Sangiovese (80%-100%)
plant
Temporary Factors
Growing
Organic fertilization and no
techniques
irrigation. Planting
densities, training systems
and systems of pruning
according to tradition not to
modify grapes
characteristics
Harvesting
Not specified

(Olive-groves) Imperia
province in Liguria
region—Italy
Terraces on medium to
high slope hills
Not specified.
Well drained
calcareous soil derived
from limestone rocks
of Eocene
Mediterranean climate:
summer average
temperature about 27°
C, winter average
temperature about 8°
C
Taggiasca (90%-100%)

According to tradition
not to compromise
organoleptic properties

Directly from plants

229. These factors are derived from the production codes and information pages of the
corresponding products available at www.chianticlassico.it and http://www.olio-extravergine.it/oliva/sicurezza-e-qualita/olio-dop/Disciplinare-Olio-Dop-Riviera-Ligure/.
230. According to the definition of the Italian Interministerial Decree of July 31, 1932.
See also DPR, art. 5 (July 12 1963); DPR, art. 3 (Aug. 9, 1967), DPR, art. 3 (July 2, 1984);
Law 164, art. 5 (Feb. 10, 1992).
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“Governo all’uso toscano”

Traditional method of
millstones or hammer
mills
Yield of
Yield of wine from grapes < Yield of oil from olives
product
70%
< 25%
Table 1: Comparison of Chianti Classico DOCG and Olio
Extravergine d’Oliva ‘Riviera Ligure—Riviera dei Fiori’ DOP
It is therefore possible to conclude that a different treatment of GIs
for olive oil and GIs for wine under the TRIPs Agreement seems to be
completely unjustified. There are no significant differences in terms of
“quality,” intended as “character of the product” and connection with
the territory, intended as elements determining the uniqueness of the
aforementioned “quality,” can be identified. The very same reasoning
also seems applicable to other categories of products such as
marmalade, balsamic vinegar and juice, but significantly different results
can be reached if wine is compared to products such as cheese and ham
for which the subsistence of certain permanent factors appears less
relevant and the temporary factors are more prominent.
“Chianti Classico DOCG” of the previous example has been
compared with the Parmiggiano Reggiano cheese (see Table 2). From
this analysis it is possible to notice that several of the permanent factors
that contribute to the uniqueness of the examined wine are missing in
the case of Parmigiano Reggiano. Nourishment of dairy cows seems to
231
Also, a
be the determinative element for Parmigiano Reggiano.
substantially different dynamic of production for the Parmigiano
Reggiano can be envisioned as compared to the one for wine, and thus,
the extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to cheese appears
more questionable than in the case of olive oil.
Although the exact relevance of the previous considerations in the
determination of the uniqueness and connection with the territory of

231. To be more specific in the comparison between Chianti wine and Parmigiano
Reggiano cheese, it is worth mentioning the following issues. First, the grape groves get their
nourishment directly from a permanent factor, the soil, while dairy cows are fed with forage
and pellets. Second, up to twenty-five percent of the cow forage may come from outside the
region of origin and the origin of the pellets is not even specified. Third, and most important,
even if one hundred percent of the forage and the pellets come from the region of origin,
there is no specification on the other permanent factors (like terrain shape, altitude, soil, and
climate) for these nourishments. Enoteca del Gallo nero s.r.l, http://www.chianticlassico.it/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2008); Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano-Reggiano, http://www.parm
igiano-reggiano.it/index.html?l=2 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
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Parmigiano Reggiano cheese as opposed to the uniqueness and
connection with the territory of wine goes beyond the purpose of this
paper, the present analysis is useful to reiterate the need of operating
the extension of Article 23 on a case-by-case basis in which the relevant
elements that connect the different categories of products to the
geographic area are identified and used in a determinative way.
Wine
Product Name
Chianti Classico DOCG
232
Permanent Factors
Region of
(Vineyards) Chianti
233
origin
Classico DOCG area Italy

Terrain shape

Slopes of hills (forbidden:
flat terrains) with
appropriate orientation
Altitude
Above 700m.
Soil
Sandstone, limestone,
marl, clayey schist, sand
and pebbles.
Climate
Mediterranean/continental
climate: humid winter (45° C), and dry, hot
summers (30° C)
Plant / animal
Sangiovese (80%-100%)
Temporary Factors

Cheese
Parmigiano Reggiano
Provinces of Parma,
Reggio-Emilia,
Modena, Bologna (on
the left bank of the river
Reno) and Mantova (on
the right bank of the
river Po)
Not directly applicable

Not directly applicable
Not directly applicable

Not directly applicable

Dairy cows

232. These factors are derived from the production codes and information pages of the
corresponding products. Enoteca del Gallo nero s.r.l, http://www.chianticlassico.it/ (last
visited Feb. 10, 2008); Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano-Reggiano, http://www.parm
igiano-reggiano.it/index.html?l=2 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
233. According to the definition of the Italian Interministerial Decree of July 31, 1932.
See also DPR 930, art. 5 (July 12 1963); DPR, art. 3 (Aug. 9, 1967), DPR, art. 3 (July 2, 1984);
Law 164, art. 5 (Feb. 10, 1992).
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Growing
techniques /
Cattle breeding
techniques

Harvesting /
Cow milking
Making
techniques

Organic fertilization and
no irrigation. Planting
densities, training systems
and systems of pruning
according to tradition not
to modify grapes
characteristics
Not specified

[12:2

Not specified

Not specified

“Governo all’uso toscano”

Traditional techniques
following the standards
of the consortium
Yield of
Yield of wine from grapes 1 Kg from 16 liters of
product
< 70%
milk
Table 2: Comparison of Chianti Classico DOCG and Parmigiano
Reggiano Cheese

IV. GENERIC TERMS, PRE-EXISTING RIGHTS AND THE EU INITIATIVE
TO RECLAIM THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF CERTAIN GIS
The most recent issue in the international negotiations on GIs is the
legitimacy of the EU initiative to regain the exclusive use of certain GIs
for the relevant WTO member states, even where they are currently
considered as “generics” or “trademarks” in other WTO member states.
The EU proposal was presented for the first time in the context of the
agricultural negotiations and so far has been strongly opposed to the
234
point of jeopardizing even the negotiations over other subjects.
Before Cancun, fifteen European countries prepared a list of forty-one
regional products of very high and recognized quality and with
235
Some
“appellations of origin” whose GIs are used all over the world.
examples are Prosciutto di Parma, Prosciutto San Daniele, Parmigiano
Reggiano, Grana Padano, Pecorino Romano, Mozzarella di Bufala
Campana, Mortadella di Bologna, as well as Chianti, Grappe di Barolo,
236
and Marsala.

234. See supra Part II.B; note 123.
235. See also Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta and Bourbon: The Spirites Debate About
Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2006).
236. Id.
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A. The Issue
The EU initiative discussed here originates mainly from two issues:
237
the market access problem created by the exceptions included in
238
Article 24 and what is considered an historical argument. The market
access problem consists of the fact that
[t]he use of [the] TRIPs exceptions in certain individual cases
prevent the EU producers to effectively use their GIs in third
markets . . . . This may happen either de jure (e.g. when a
company of country A registers, as a trademark, a GI of country
B in country A and thus impedes producers of country B to use
this name in country A, thus forcing country B’s producers to relabel the product in order to market it) or de facto (e.g. country
A considers a certain GI of a country B as a “generic” term that
is freely used for poor-quality products; by the time country B
starts marketing its genuine GI product, the reputation
associated with that GI is so eroded that any investment in
239
recuperating its image is futile . . . ).
As noted by one commentator, the “historical argument” refers
instead to the fact that “[GIs] identify real . . . places, and inhabitants
should not be deprived of their inherent right to use their place names
240
In other words “[t]hey should not
in relation to their products.”
become victims of their own success . . . under the guise of genericness,”
241
or trademark protection.
Therefore, those supporting this EU
initiative object to other countries “usurping” their terms. Conversely,
those opposing the EU initiative reject the “usurping” accusation
242
particularly in situations where immigrants have taken the methods of
making the products and the names with them to their new homes.
Furthermore, they also generally question a priori the existence of a
mandate under Doha to negotiate over this issue. In this regard, many
commentators have underscored that, “[s]ome countries have a long
tradition in manufacturing products which were brought by immigrants

237. Burkhart Goebel, Geographical Indications and Trademarks—The Road from
Doha, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 964, 991 (2003).
238. Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 173.
239. Goebel, supra note 237, at 991. “An example [is] ‘champagne’ which in many
countries is perceived as a generic term for sparkling wine.” Id.
240. Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 173.
241. Id.
242. See supra text accompanying note 228.
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with special knowledge and skills from their old to their new home
countries and which then were produced under the same geographical
243
name as the one used in their country of origin.” The issue, therefore,
is whether in such situations the producers in the “new countries,”
whose products are labeled with those GIs included in the EU list,
should still be allowed to use their trademarks.
B. Generic Terms and the Issue of Pre-Existing Rights
Notwithstanding the importance of the arguments advanced on
behalf of the EU request, such as the need for protection of the cultural
identity and traditions embedded in the creation of the products
included in the list, the argument presented against the EU position has
to be preferred particularly when the contested name has become
generic in the country where people from Europe immigrated and
settled. Indeed, in these countries the protection of GIs that over time
244
245
have become generic would cause consumers to be misled and thus
246
could also cause trade distortion.
As for the other terms on the EU list that are not yet generic and
consist instead of trademarks, no exception to the general conclusion
presented in the previous chapter for the extension of Article 23 of the
TRIPs Agreement should be granted. Therefore, the higher protection,
consisting in the grant of the exclusive use of these terms to those
producers located in the area defined by the geographic word in
consideration, should be provided only to those GIs on products that
247
can be considered similar to wines and spirits.
The exception included in Article 24(4) of the TRIPs Agreement has
to be applied in cases of subsistence of pre-existing rights, which consist
of trademarks on similar products comprising of those geographic terms
248
to which Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement should be extended. As
noted by the same authors, this is not a new problem as the same
249
situation happened in the past with wines and spirits. Indeed, Article
24(4) establishes that:
243. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 889.
244. O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 43.
245. Indeed, in this case consumers would not perceive that GIs indicate that the
product to which they are associated come from a particular region, but would associate them
to a general set of characteristics that pertain to a particular product.
246. See supra Part III.A; note 149.
247. See supra Part III.C.
248. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(4).
249. See Bowers, supra note 63, at 162.
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Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to prevent
continued and similar use of a particular geographical indication
of another Member identifying wines or spirits in connection
with goods or services by any of its nationals or domiciliaries who
have used that geographical indication in a continuous manner
with regard to the same or related goods or services in the
territory of that Member either (a) for at least 10 years preceding
250
15 April 1994 or (b) in good faith preceding that date.
As it can be seen, “when additional protection was negotiated for
251
wines and spirits, a favorable solution for ‘immigrants’ was found.” In
that specific case, the problem was solved by the adoption of the
aforementioned exceptions included in Article 24(4) of the TRIPs
Agreement that “safeguard[s] the acquired rights of . . . producers of
wines and spirits, who have had a long tradition in using a particular GI
not originating from that country in a continuous manner with regard to
252
the same or related goods for at least ten years.”
The logical conclusion is therefore that if an extension of protection
of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to those terms listed by the EU
that are not yet generic occurs, the exception included in Article 24 of
the TRIPs Agreement should be extended as well.
CONCLUSION
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the negotiations
surrounding the international regulation of GIs are still open and very
controversial. Several political and economic obstacles seem to
delineate irreconcilable positions among the WTO member states with
very few negotiable points. Nevertheless, GIs are valuable economic
tools and have the potential of providing new opportunities of
development for those countries that are in great need of economic
growth. Therefore, further analysis of this subject is required in order to
define alternative solutions to the different issues presented in the
negotiations.
While the creation of the multilateral register for wines and spirits
appears to be quite straightforward, the extension of the higher level of
protection of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to products other than
250. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(4).
251. See O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 50.
252. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 890.
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wines and spirits is a more complicated issue. In the latter case, the
specific interests of single WTO Member States should be put aside and
the solution supported by the stronger economic rationale should be
preferred.
Finally, the recent EU initiative of reclaiming the exclusive use of
certain GIs even where they are currently considered to be generic or
trademarks in other WTO Member States appears to be nothing more
than a retaliation for the deadlock of the GIs negotiations that preceded
and characterized the Cancun meeting. Indeed, no legitimate basis for
the grant of a different treatment to the listed GIs can be found.
In conclusion, it is important to underscore the significance of
preserving the integrity of certain products that in many cases represent
the result of centuries of human development, the effort to achieve the
desired result, and the strict relationship with the territory of origin.
Indeed, the uniqueness of these products provides the main justification
for the protection of their GIs.
APPENDIX
FIGURE 1
The graph shown in this figure represents the passage from Article
22 to Article 23 in terms of information, competition, and utility to
consumers. At market equilibrium, the information of Article 22 (I1)
and the corresponding competition (C1) are represented by point A1 on
the indifference utility curve u1. If the protection is extended to Article
23, the market will settle in a different point of equilibrium represented
by A2, which is the combination of a certain amount of information (I2)
and competition (C2) on the indifference utility curve u2. An increase in
information beyond Article 22 is less useful to consumers because after
that point the consumer is not misled, that is, the consumer has enough
information to make the desired purchase. Therefore, the utility
corresponding to the information provided by Article 23 has to be lower
(u2 < u1). At the same time, the reduction in competition is much higher
in this case than in the situation in which A1 moves to A3 and the utility
is constant. Indeed, in this case A1 moves to A2 on a lower utility curve
and C1 moves to C2 and not C3.
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FIGURE 2
A possible explanation of the development of the wine market in the
last decade is reported here. The graph shown in this figure represents
the passage from A1 to A2 in terms of quality, competition, and utility to
consumers. A1 and A2 are the market equilibrium points with level of
quality, Q1 and Q2, and levels of competition, C1 and C2. As the quality
increased from Q1 to Q2, A1 moved to A2 and not, for example, to A3,
which, assuming constant utility, would have determined a decrease of
competition from C1 to C3. This is because the consumer demand for
more quality has been so strong to put an increase in quality on a higher
utility curve u2 (u2 > u1). In fact, C1 moved to C2 as seems to be testified
by the expansion of wine exports of the countries that are not
traditionally considered wine producers.
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